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venerdì 7 ottobre 2016
giovedì 4 agosto 2016
OUT NOW! Obsolete Capitalism: The Strong of the Future. Nietzsche's accelerationist fragment in Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus (Rizosfera, 2016, SF 001.eng)
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" (...) As widely known the reference to Nietzsche in the famous «accelerationist passage» in Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus is decisive and closes the paragraph entitled "The Civilized Capitalist Machine" (Chapter III, Par. 9, pp. 222-239). Until today the various commentators of such passage have left aside or overshadowed the specific reference to Friedrich Nietzsche’s «Große Prozeß», others have simply quoted the «accelerate the process» issue referenced by Deleuze and Guattari, mentioning Nietzsche’s book "The Will of Power" but no one has ever referred to the precise fragment or its context and the potential themes it implies. (...) Our research has identified the precise Nietzschean fragment quoted by Deleuze and Guattari as shown above. It is a fragment positioned in two different Friedrich Nietzsche’s posthumous editions. (...) "
" (...) As widely known the reference to Nietzsche in the famous «accelerationist passage» in Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus is decisive and closes the paragraph entitled "The Civilized Capitalist Machine" (Chapter III, Par. 9, pp. 222-239). Until today the various commentators of such passage have left aside or overshadowed the specific reference to Friedrich Nietzsche’s «Große Prozeß», others have simply quoted the «accelerate the process» issue referenced by Deleuze and Guattari, mentioning Nietzsche’s book "The Will of Power" but no one has ever referred to the precise fragment or its context and the potential themes it implies. (...) Our research has identified the precise Nietzschean fragment quoted by Deleuze and Guattari as shown above. It is a fragment positioned in two different Friedrich Nietzsche’s posthumous editions. (...) "
sabato 28 maggio 2016
OUT NOW! - MONETA, RIVOLUZIONE E FILOSOFIA DELL'AVVENIRE (RIZOSFERA/OBSOLETE CAPITALISM FREE PRESS, 2016)
E' finalmente disponibile online l'antologia e.book curata dal collettivo Obsolete Capitalism intitolata «Moneta, rivoluzione e filosofia dell'avvenire. Nietzsche e la politica accelerazionista in Deleuze, Foucault, Guattari, Klossowski» (Edizioni Rizosfera/Obsolete Capitalism Free Press, 2016).
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Gli autori sono: Algorithmic Committee, Sara Baranzoni, Edmund Berger, Lapo Berti, Paolo Davoli, Ettore Lancellotti, Network Ensemble, Obsolete Capitalism, Obsolete Capitalism Sound System, Letizia Rustichelli, Francesco Tacchini, Paolo Vignola.
Moneta, rivoluzione e filosofia dell’avvenire
a cura di Obsolete Capitalism
Siamo proiettati a velocità fotonica nella comunicazione istantanea e nel controllo continuo mentre le forme di dominio rapido appaiono inarrestabili. Il museo delle ideologie si riempie di concetti in via di esaurimento quali capitalismo, neoliberismo, marxismo, keynesismo. Ora, con più esattezza, il sistema modula i vari flussi che innervano il pianeta: Moneta, Ricerca, Controllo, Informazione, Circuito sono i vecchi nomi che attraverso una nuova velocità producono potere. Maggiore è l’immanenza del Mercato, maggiore è la probabilità che al conflitto si sostituisca l’interruzione, il virus, la fuga di notizie, l’invisibilità, il fuori-circuito, la biforcazione. Uno squarcio nella «zona grigia» dell’egemonia.
Gli autori del libro Moneta, rivoluzione e filosofia dell’avvenire indagano alcune aree poco battute di politica accelerazionista attraverso linee teoriche contagiate dalle filosofie più visionarie: Nietzsche, Klossowski, Deleuze, Guattari, Foucault. Più che analizzare la grande trasformazione culturale in atto, la presente antologia evidenzia i pericoli in cui incorre il pensiero del futuro quando ancora mantiene pratiche, schemi e linguaggi di un’epoca industriale e post-industriale che mostra in tutti i suoi aspetti una crisi perpetua. Siamo tutti coinvolti nel duro intreccio di liberazioni insperate e nuovi asservimenti che ci prospetta la presentificazione del futuro da parte della tecnologia a linguaggio numerico, ma - come afferma Deleuze - «non è il caso né di avere paura, né di sperare, bisogna cercare nuove armi». Sperimentare è dunque il primo impegno politico e filosofico per un futuro differente.
domenica 1 maggio 2016
4.6. Compliant supports and formations of sovereignty - Pt. XXVII - Excerpt from the essay «Money, Revolution and Acceleration in Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus», Obsolete Capitalism Free Press/Rizosphere, 2016
Compliant supports and formations of sovereignty
The settlement and the coalition of instinctual forces in an endless turmoil aimed at opposing the besieging social and economic body provide us with the grid of the battle that happens inside and outside bodies. The “grim organisations” of social syntheses that surround bodies and impulsive forces are nothing but Nietzsche Herrschaftsgebilde, the formations of sovereignty which we can trace in Nietzsche’s posthumous fragments of 1887 and 1888. Inside and outside the body, the battle between impulsive forces infuriates. Sensuality, and its following stage, sexuality, impede any perspective, even an economic one, thus they must be repressed. The first wave of repression is used by formations of sovereignty to structure a compliant whole, or, in Klossowski’s terms, an “organic and psychic unity”. Although it is formed inside the shell of the whole as “completed essence”, the compliant support is always and anyway object of the battle of impulses and instincts in the attempt to free themselves from formations of sovereignty and from the forces that constitute them. The expression outbursts of these struggles and counter-struggles, attacks and oppositions, manifest themselves “through a hierarchy of values translated into a hierarchy of needs” (LC, 4). According to Klossowski “the hierarchy of needs is the economic form of repression that the existing institutions impose by and through the agent’s consciousness on the imponderable forces of his psychic life” (LC, 4). Klossowski’s condemnation of traditions – and his gregarious “translations” – which dominate society is rather incisive. He faces three contemporary interpretations which fight the liberation goals of the Rhizosphere and attack the generalized economy in which the libidinal values participate through the new hierarchy of impulses, which philosophers like Deleuze want to initiate: the laissez-faire attitude that traverses the hierarchy of needs dictates a different hierarchy of values thanks to the exclusion of the sexual need from primary needs, nullifying its emotional value; Marxism, which enthrones industrial economy and commercialized values as the primary structure, relegating the sexual sphere to the super-structure; psychoanalysis, which accepts to segregate the libidinal economy to the family triangle, separating the social aspect from the object of study, and suffering the same division operated by Marxism – society will be the object of study of scientific socialism, while the subconscious and the family social atom will be of interest to psychoanalysis. In Klossowski, the authors that belong to the triad of dominance and subjection are Raymond Aron, Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud. The purpose of the Rhizosphere will be to liberate the individual and collective revolutionary potential by overturning and overcoming on this point Nietzsche, who, on the contrary, in The Strong of the Future wished for a discrete community of irregular and exchangeable seditious. Deleuze and Guattari in the Anti-Œdipus intervene on the topic of the opposition to the dominant economic rules through secret impulsive production, and they do so by linking their argument to this exact crucial passage of Klossowski’s Living Currency. The two Parisian philosophers point out that “[t]he two kinds of fantasy, or rather the two regimes, are therefore distinguished according to whether the social production of "goods" imposes its rule on desire through the intermediary of an ego whose fictional unity is guaranteed by the goods themselves, or whether the desiring-production of affects imposes its rule on institutions whose elements are no longer anything but drives” (AE, 63). We will have, in the first regime, the subjugated, the gregarious-supports and exchangeability, while in the second regime the “desiring machines”, nomads and the schizo of the future who crave for commercial inconvertibility. In the history of utopian socialism, a French philosopher, among the least current, worked on topics like community, affections, economy and social harmony: Charles Fourier. Both Klossowski – in The Living Currency – and Deleuze and Guattari – in the Anti-Œdipus – recall his work:
“If we must still speak of Utopia in this sense, a la Fourier, it is most assuredly not as an ideal model, but as revolutionary action and passion. In his recent works Klossowski indicates to us the only means of bypassing the sterile parallelism where we flounder between Freud and Marx: by discovering how social production and relations of production are an institution of desire, and how affects or drives form part of the infrastructure itself. For they are part of it, the y are present the re in every way while creating within the economic forms their own repression, as well as the means for breaking this repression” (AE, 63).
domenica 10 aprile 2016
4.3. The xeno-dollar and money as an instrument of hegemonic power - Pt. XXIV - Excerpt from the essay «Money, Revolution and Acceleration in Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus», Obsolete Capitalism Free Press/Rizosphere, 2016
The xeno-dollar and money
as an instrument of hegemonic power
At the beginning of the 70’s, the topic of money became a primary concern in the rhizosphere. Thanks to differential- money, namely the main instrument used by liberal democratic systems to assault, restructure and regularise national and international economic crises, the French Nietzschean revolutionary community wanted to build a new analytic grid that could overcome the ideological morass which still clutches a significant portion of the traditional Left as well as of the new antagonistic Left. Klossowski produced, as his farewell to publishing and writing, a brief text, dense and enigmatic, titled La Monnaie vivante (Living Currency, 1970), which presented his peers with more than one critical interrogative on the industrial and commercial world, and on money as an instrument and simulacrum of the vital agent soothing human impulses. In a handwritten letter sent in autumn 1970, Foucault greeted Klossowski’s volume as “the greatest book of our times”. That was the same period in which, at the beginning of 1971, Deleuze and Guattari attended Foucault’s lectures at the Collège, having just finished the in itinere draft of the Anti- Œdipe. The role of the “imperial” currency – the US dollar as hegemonic currency – within the Western economic system, as well as the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rates regime, were at the centre of the tense international political debate. In December 1969 inflation in the United States reached 6%. Nixon, as soon as he was elected president, was struck by the prediction made by his own staff that the dollar had to be rescued in maximum two years. The world was jammed by xeno-dollars and the US reserves could not compensate anymore the increase in the global amount of dollars with the corresponding amount of gold as contemplated in the agreement. In a few months, in 1971, violence in the Vietnam war reached its peak, and so did military expenses and the related budget deficit. The United States had entered a
recession in 1970 and unemployment was
at 6% and growing. The issues presented
by domestic economic circumstances were
unprecedented: inflation was high in a
phase of recession, as opposed to the usual
combination of recession and deflation, as
it had previously happened during the Great
Depression in 1929. The situation was out
of hand. There was no empirically tested
academic theory which corresponded to
such an economic situation; there was no
plan. Any technical decision could equally
mean the salvation of global commercial
leadership or its collapse, precisely at a
time when the international Communist
movement was challenging Anglo-Saxon
industrial capitalism the most. The
sudden breakdown of the Bretton Woods
system could cause a rapid downfall of
the hegemony of American power, the
winner of World War II. Power can switch
sign. Nixon’s staff was divided between
monetarists, namely the rising star
Friedman and the Chicago School, and
orthodox mainstream economists, such as
Burns and the Federal Reserve. Friedman
and those favouring the free floating of
exchange rates unpegged from the gold
standard prevailed. Timing was crucial. In
May 1971 West Germany left the Bretton
Woods system, instituted in 1944 on the
ashes of the Axis Powers, letting the
German Mark free to float. The situation
deteriorated and Nixon’s economic staff
had to hurry: it was time to take actions
because the element of surprise and the
promptness of intervention were crucial.
In August 1971, Nixon suddenly announced
to the nation and to the whole world that
the US dollar was not convertible in gold
anymore, leaving the American currency
free to float too. After about 3,000 years
from its invention, money lost its tie to
an objective and concrete value. It was
the first time in Western history, without
considering the periods of war and brief
experiments, always ended in failure:
money completed its final transformation,
to which it was probably destined ever since
its invention, becoming a pure simulacrum
of value in all its forms, from the round-
shaped metal piece to banknotes. The
question that economists asked themselves
are several: Will the “orphan money” be
able to stand only based on its face value?
Will the hegemonic currency, i.e. the dollar,
be able to walk on an “empty space”? Has
money grown enough to demonstrate its
maturity? The monetary de-aurification is
the temporary situation in which we are
still today: a mixture of sovereign, post-
sovereign, xeno- and headless currencies
that float freely without any fixed exchange
rate, victims of speculations and market
imbalances. However, the monetary
coordinates within which Foucault
develops his analysis are not simply related
to the contingency of events, but rather to
the study of forces and their effects on the
domain of sovereign formations associated
to the research and analyses conducted
within the Rhizosphere. The concept of
money considered by Foucault in the
lectures that he gave between 10 February
and 10 March 1971 is, surprisingly for most
people but not for the Rhizomatics, the
Ancient Greek currency employed between
the seventh and fifth century B.C.; that
is the historical, social, economic and
institutional period when money, conceived
as Greek measurement, eventually
becomes the core of an “immense social
and polymorphous practice of assessment,
quantification, establishing equivalences,
and the search for appropriate proportions
and distributions” (LWK, 134). According
to Foucault, this analysis should approach
the hypothesis according to which money
constitutes a political instrument used to
create and preserve new balances during
profound social transformations: thus,
money does not preserve relations of
sovereignty but relations of dominance.
It is fascinating how Foucault introduces
the concept of money towards the end of
the lecture he gave on 17 February 1971,
as redistribution of relations between the
discourse of justice and the discourse of
knowledge, and of the relations between
the just, measurement, order and truth:
“The institution of money, which is not just
a measure of exchange, but which was
established mainly as an instrument of
distribution, division, and social correction”
(LWK, 129).
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domenica 3 aprile 2016
4.2. The insurrection of subjugated knowledges - Pt. XXIII - Excerpt from the essay «Money, Revolution and Acceleration in Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus», Obsolete Capitalism Free Press/Rizosphere, 2016
The insurrection of subjugated knowledges
In the lecture he gave on 7 January 1976, Foucault focused his attention on returns of knowledge that descend from what he calls “insurrection of subjugated knowledges”.
With this expression he refers to two
specific factors: 1) the ‘knowledges’ that
derive from historical contents, which he
deems buried, and thus adequate to be
subjected to a rediscovery attributable, to
a ‘sumptuous’ research linked, in a way, to
“typical secret societies of the West” since
ancient times and emerged at the time of
early Christianity: the “great warm and
tender Freemasonry of useless erudition” –
here, with his peculiar and subtle humour,
Foucault introduces his own analysis and
the one of his rhizospheric fellows just
like modern variations of the struggle and
insurrection of Alexandrine gnosis related
to the idea of salvation through knowledge.
The French rhizosphere is, according to
the malicious Foucaultian antichristian-
Nitzschean-accelerationist interpretation,
a sort of secular and revolutionary neo-gnosis which hands its wisdom and
research over from one generation to the
next, following the Hellenic-Alexandrine
tradition.
2) those ‘knowledges’ that are assumed to lay on the opposite side of “dusty and useless” erudition, that is, those disqualified and inadequate knowledges – here, once again, presented in an extraordinary way. In this category of “naïve knowledges located low down on the hierarchy” beneath the required academic and scientific levels, Foucault includes popular knowledge (“le savoir des gens”) – which must not be confused with “general common sense” – like those of criminals, crazy people, ill persons, psychiatric patients, detainees. The direct knowledge of these subjects, merged with the specific knowledges of specialised workers, like nurses, doctors and soldiers, will not result in a “general common-sense knowledge”, but in a “a differential knowledge incapable of unanimity and which owes its force only to the harshness with which it is opposed by everything surrounding it” (PK, 82)
Foucault does not miss the paradox of enclosing in the same rhizomatic framework of subjugated knowledges both “the academia and the street”: nonetheless he finds in this well-marked disparity the essential leverage of the critique promoted with those discontinuous discourses. According to Foucault this is “historical knowledge of struggles”: “In the specialised areas of erudition as in the disqualified, popular knowledge there lay the memory of hostile encounters which even up to this day have been confined to the margins of knowledge. What emerges out of this is something one might call a genealogy, or rather a multiplicity of genealogical re- searches, a painstaking rediscovery of struggles together with the rude memory of their conflicts. And these genealogies, that are the combined product of an erudite knowledge and a popular knowledge, were not possible and could not even have been attempted except on one condition, namely that the tyranny of globalising discourses with their hierarchy and all their privileges of a theoretical avant-garde was eliminated” (PK, 83) . In this passage, Foucault attempts an early outline of his overall plan, where he
2) those ‘knowledges’ that are assumed to lay on the opposite side of “dusty and useless” erudition, that is, those disqualified and inadequate knowledges – here, once again, presented in an extraordinary way. In this category of “naïve knowledges located low down on the hierarchy” beneath the required academic and scientific levels, Foucault includes popular knowledge (“le savoir des gens”) – which must not be confused with “general common sense” – like those of criminals, crazy people, ill persons, psychiatric patients, detainees. The direct knowledge of these subjects, merged with the specific knowledges of specialised workers, like nurses, doctors and soldiers, will not result in a “general common-sense knowledge”, but in a “a differential knowledge incapable of unanimity and which owes its force only to the harshness with which it is opposed by everything surrounding it” (PK, 82)
Foucault does not miss the paradox of enclosing in the same rhizomatic framework of subjugated knowledges both “the academia and the street”: nonetheless he finds in this well-marked disparity the essential leverage of the critique promoted with those discontinuous discourses. According to Foucault this is “historical knowledge of struggles”: “In the specialised areas of erudition as in the disqualified, popular knowledge there lay the memory of hostile encounters which even up to this day have been confined to the margins of knowledge. What emerges out of this is something one might call a genealogy, or rather a multiplicity of genealogical re- searches, a painstaking rediscovery of struggles together with the rude memory of their conflicts. And these genealogies, that are the combined product of an erudite knowledge and a popular knowledge, were not possible and could not even have been attempted except on one condition, namely that the tyranny of globalising discourses with their hierarchy and all their privileges of a theoretical avant-garde was eliminated” (PK, 83) . In this passage, Foucault attempts an early outline of his overall plan, where he
generously includes and aligns the French
components of the rhizosphere and, above
all, the authors of the Anti-Œdipe, although
the detailed description of the “returns
of knowledge” fits perfectly his research
style. That style which he adopted at the
beginning of his lectures at the Collège de
France (1970) and carried on until the end
of that period, 1975-1976, the year before
the crucial 1977 when he entered a period
of crisis and suspended his course. It was
Foucault’s annus horribilis, during which
he received attacks from multiple fronts
– such as Baudrillard’s Forget Foucault –
and started a profound reformulation of
his thought, his analysis and his political
approach, which in turn would end his
friendship with Deleuze and destroy the
underground empathy within the French
Nietzschean revolutionary community.
What seems extraordinary is the way
in which Foucault linked his research to
the fight and critique of his rhizospheric
fellows, attributing the essential leverage
of the critique and of the “success” of
those years precisely to the discontinuity
and de-centralisation of practices and
discourse advocated by Klossowski,
Deleuze and Guattari, Blanchot and
Lyotard, among others. In 1976, Foucault
is able to advance this critique: “Let us give
the term genealogy to the union of erudite
knowledge and local memories which allows
us to establish a historical knowledge of
struggles and to make use of this knowledge
tactically today” (PK, 83) . During the same
lecture, Foucault links the genealogy to the
struggle against the alleged “scientificity”
of the new sciences, namely Marxism and
Psychoanalysis, guilty of bearing “power
ambitions”, not even concealed, and thus
of pursuing those “effects of power” that
usually institutions assign to enthroned
sciences. According to Foucault, “By
comparison, then, and in contrast to the
various projects which aim to inscribe
knowledges in the hierarchical order of
power associated with science, a genealogy
should be seen as a kind of attempt to
emancipate historical knowledges from that
subjection, to render them, that is, capable
of opposition and of struggle against the
coercion of a theoretical, unitary, formal
and scientific discourse. It is based on a
reactivation of local knowledges – of minor
knowledges, as Deleuze might call them – in
opposition to the scientific hierarchisation
of knowledges and the effects intrinsic
to their power: this, then, is the project
of these disordered and fragmentary
genealogies. If we were to characterise it in
two terms, then 'archaeology' would be the
appropriate methodology of this analysis of
local discursivities, and 'genealogy' would
be the tactics whereby, on the basis of the
descriptions of these local discursivities,
the subjected knowledges which were thus
released would be brought into play” (PK, 85)
In Foucault’s works, within the genealogy/ archive relation mentioned above, special attention is reserved to money, ever since the first lectures of his inaugural course in 1970-71, directly after the re-emergence in Klossowski and Deleuze of Nietzschean
In Foucault’s works, within the genealogy/ archive relation mentioned above, special attention is reserved to money, ever since the first lectures of his inaugural course in 1970-71, directly after the re-emergence in Klossowski and Deleuze of Nietzschean
topics such as will to power, formations
of sovereignty, impulse and value.
Indeed, an early taste of the strong and
innovative critical capacity on this front –
which includes aspirations, will to power,
universal rhizomatic economy, physical and
noologic subconscious – comes from the
debut of Deleuze and Guattari as authors,
under the sign of Klossowski. La synthèse
disjunctive is the title of their first essay
dedicated to Klossowski and published
in the 43rd issue of the journal L’Arc,
precisely in the third term of 1970. The text
is presented already as the abstract of a
book titled Capitalism and schizophrenia.
The writing style is already the imaginary,
transverse, aggressive, humoristic and
“genealogic” one of the Anti-Œdipe. La
synthèse disjunctive is an incisive prelude
to an announced explosion: Foucault
immediately grasps the collateral effects
that it would have on the style and content
of his own research.
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venerdì 1 aprile 2016
domenica 27 marzo 2016
4.1. To subvert the braking effect of totality - Pt. XXII - Excerpt from the essay «Money, Revolution and Acceleration in Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus», Obsolete Capitalism Free Press/Rizosphere, 2016
chapteR iv
The infinite money: desire, value and simulacrum
Truths are coins which have lost their pictures and now matter only as metal, no longer as coins.
—Friedrich Nietzsche, On truth and lies in a non-moral sense
We need units in order to count, but it may not be assumed that such units [of measure] exist.
—Friedrich Nietzsche, fr. 14[79]
If we examine the main works of Deleuze, Foucault and Klossowski published between 1968 and 1972, we can observe that the courses of these texts objectively bear enigmatic and common features that could allow us to regard them as ‘fragmentary research projects’; these are investigations that could hardly be conceived and envisaged if we evaluate them from a ‘revolutionary’ perspective with the aim of identifying on which common battleground and common agenda these three intellectuals act. They swing with remarkable aplomb from far-sighted and vibrant essays with an academic flavour, such as Difference and Repetition or The Archaeology of Knowledge, to hermeneutic works on Nietzsche – which include both anthologies of fragments like Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, and of first editions of his Œuvres Complètes published by Gallimard – continuing with literary criticism or tout-court literature works such as The Logic of Sense or The Women of Rome, and finishing with cryptic economical essays, La Monnaie Vivante, or aggressively political pamphlets, The Anti-Œdipus; not to mention, then, their academic lectures ranging from Freud to Marx, from Aristotle to Nietzsche, from Greek currency to the Medieval Inquisition or history of sexuality, without any interruption. Foucault himself, with a certain irony, in his first lecture on 7 January 1976 part of a course titled Society Must Be Defended, wants to terminate a line of research that he himself defines incoherent and discontinuous. Foucault feels the need to end and systematise, in some way, the several lines of research, insight and analysis that he had been carrying on since he started his lectures at the Collège de France (1970). From a certain point of view, Foucault does not mention only his research, but alludes also to a common path of the French revolutionary rhizosphere when he lists among the relevant, or at least interesting, elements of the previous fifteen years “I am thinking of the efficacy of a book such as L 'Anti-Œdipe, which really has no other source of reference than its own prodigious theoretical inventiveness: a book, or rather a thing, an event, which has managed, even at the most mundane level of psychoanalytic practice, to introduce a note of shrillness into that murmured exchange that has for so long continued uninterrupted between couch and armchair” (PK, 80) . This is an important indication to his students since
the philosophical work of Deleuze has
always been a crucial point of reference for
Foucault, because it had openly established
itself as an “ally” of his theories since the
early sixties, or at least from the beginning
of the “Nietzsche Renaissance” and, thus,
from the publication of Nietzsche and
Philosophy (1962) and the Royaumont
conference (1964). What is most surprising
is the importance that Foucault confers
to the anti-œdipic text, because his
analysis takes into account “the last ten,
fifteen, twenty years at most”, hence the
timeframe that goes, approximately, from
1956 and 1976: not only the Anti-Œdipus
is the only book to be referenced, but its
position in Foucault’s argument surprises
us the most. The volume, indeed, is referred
to in the context of “this amazing efficacy of
discontinuous,particularandlocalcriticism”
and its efficacy is compared to that of
entire movements such as anti-psychiatry,
existential analysis, and attacks upon the
legal and penal system. Foucault concludes:
“I would say, then, that what has emerged
in the course of the last ten or fifteen years
is a sense of the increasing vulnerability to
criticism of things, institutions, practices,
discourses. A certain fragility has been
discovered in the very bedrock of existence-
even, and perhaps above all, in those
aspects of it that are most familiar, most
solid and most intimately related to our
bodies and to our everyday behaviour. But
together with this sense of instability and
this amazing efficacy of discontinuous,
particular and local criticism, one in fact
also discovers something that perhaps was
not initially foreseen, something one might
describe as precisely the inhibiting effect
of global, totalitarian theories. It is not that
these global theories have not provided nor
continue to provide in a fairly consistent
fashion useful tools for local research:
Marxism and psychoanalysis are proofs of
this. [...] In each case, the attempt to think
in terms of a totality has in fact proved a
hindrance to research” (PK, 80-81) By
following Foucault’s outline, we can identify
two opposite fronts: on the one hand, the
«accelerationist» front, irregular, peculiar
and local; on the other hand, a front more
“restraining”, “braking”, continuous, global,
total, and openly totalitarian. Marxism
and psychoanalysis can still be useful
instruments at a local level, but, according
to Foucault, when confronted with facts,
they have had a “braking” thus negative
function for the insurrectionary front.
L 'Anti-Œdipe, in Foucault’s opinion, fits
perfectly in the domain of those critical
entities capable of causing landslides and
provided with some peculiar characteristics
that could be summarised as follows: 1)
autonomous – instead of centralized –
technical production 2) wisdom returns to
scale which descend from the insurrection
of subjugated wisdoms.
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domenica 20 marzo 2016
E.3.7. Second portrait of the revolutionary: the Deleuzian rhizomatic nomad - Pt. XXI - Excerpt from the essay «Money, Revolution and Acceleration in Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus», Obsolete Capitalism Free Press/Rizosphere, 2016
Second portrait of the revolutionary:
the Deleuzian rhizomatic nomad
Following the words of the book Anti-Œdipus we portray a quite canonical image of the schizo-delirious revolutionary man: “... a schizo-revolutionary type or pole that follows the lines of escape of desire; breaches the wall and causes flows to move; assembles its machines and its groups-in-fusion in the enclaves or at the periphery—proceeding in an inverse fashion from that of the other pole: I am not your kind, I belong eternally to the inferior race, I am a beast, a black.” (AO, 277) But in other writings Deleuze’s position is less reassuring: “Militant revolutionaries cannot be concerned with delinquency, deviance, and madness — not as educators or reformers,but as those who can read the face of their proper difference only in such mirrors.” (DI, 201). The subversive is then a prismatic simulacrum who collects various points of view: the criminal’s or the diverse and fool man’s and is forced to elaborate the different aspects in which he mirrors his diversity: himself, his marginality, the phantasmal world he belongs to and the
rest of the social body, reaching a deformed
singularity which self-affirms differently
from what the false counter-identity of
a presumed antagonistic vocation would
do, once compared to «respectable
people». Differently from Nietzsche the
rhizomatic is not nihilist, he appreciates
the revolution as an accelerated event of
transvaluation of all values, and provided
that he accepts the register of Nietzsche’s
corrosive parody, he will revolve it in
positive looking for «new ways». This new
rhizomatic politics is very different from
the more traditional one of the communist
and socialist movements in the XIX and XX
century. To evaluate such difference let us
read the conspiracy notion as interpreted
by Klossowski and Deleuze: “There is a
topic which Klossowski addressed, I believe,
at the same time that he was addressing
the loss of identity, namely, the topic of
singularity, by which he means the “non-
identical”. A conspiracy, if one understands
Klossowski’s thinking, is a community of
singularities. The question, then, configured
in term of the political (understood either in
its contemporary or ancient sense) is this:
how are we to conceive of a community of
singularities?” (CV, 46). For the first time
in history one could here locate a new way
of being revolutionary, a strategy of ways,
of non-identities: an overturning of the
basic concepts of revolution as expression
of organization of a social group, in favour
of a heuristic insurrectional. A revolution
which does not recognize useful any of the
previous revolutionary models, and whose
final aim is not gaining power. As Deleuze
said, the so-called society is a community
of regularities or more precisely, a certain
selective process which retains select
singularities and regularises them. In
order to maintain the proper functioning
of society it selects for regularisation, to
use the language of psychoanalysis, what
might be called paranoiac singularities. But
a conspiracy - this would be a community of
singularities of another type, which would
not be regularised, but which would enter into
new connections, and in this sense, would
be revolutionary.” (CV 46, 47). Here lies the
real “heart” of the fragment The Strong of
the Future and of Deleuze’s Nomad Thought.
With the eyes of the book Anti-Œdipus the
great process of regularization is the same
great process of the Western oikonomia
which allows the rational functioning of a
highly numbered community of market-
subjugated singularities: “... the human
species... articulates itself, through
production, in order to maintain itself at
the level of humanity, [and] can only do so
through the absurdity of a total reduction
of its moral resources achieved through
work itself.” (CV,37) What remains open is
the way singularities can be linked among
them, we mean «connections» and not
«institutions». The selective criterion of
the Eternal Return - if the perspective is the
extreme bifurcation of discrete productions
of non-identities from macro-repetitions of
homogenous identities - is possible only on
the basis of a double selection of human
types: the essential - seen as «mass-value»
in relation to the mercantile society, and
the surplus - seen as «waste-value», an
impersonal and singularized-plusvalue
apt to form societies and groups (CV, 47).
According to Deleuze the «surplus men»
“are motionless, and the nomadic adventure
begins when they seek to stay in the same
place by escaping the codes.”(DI, 259) The
nomad is defined by Deleuze as a mobile
centre of resistance, an enchanted traveller
with inconceivable horizons, a motionless
traveller on collective bodies. The last big
problem to face now is the following: both
gregarious and unassimilated ones live
and fight in a demoralizing unjust macro-
scenario. How is it possible to weave the
net of light self-organized bounds in the
existing massive-unifying social structure?
Will such a net be able to support the
various connections among diversities in
future times?
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domenica 13 marzo 2016
E.3.6. The Great Politics and the revolutionary - Pt. XX - Excerpt from the essay «Money, Revolution and Acceleration in Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus», Obsolete Capitalism Free Press/Rizosphere, 2016
The Great Politics and the revolutionary
Another point we have to make is to identify the revolutionary type of the Anti-Œdipus. The physiognomy has been already outlined in two different forms in Anti-Œdipus. Guattari in an interview for the magazine «Neue Zeitung» in 1972 with regards to the identification among analyst, patient and activist says: “First of all no one has ever said that the analyst is the same as the schizophrenic man but that the analyst, as well as the activist or the writer or anybody else, is more or less engaged in a schizoid process and there is always a difference between the schizo process and the process of a schizophrenic man interned in an insane-asylum, as his schizo process is blocked or goes uselessly around in circles. We are not saying that the revolutionary group need to identify with the madmen going uselessly round in circles, but that they need to push their actions into a schizo- way process.” According to Guattari the schizophrenic man does not coincide with the madman but becomes schizo when he clashes with an individual or collective «desiring process» which holds at its centre a «libidinal energy» able to drive him from an assessed subject to a new open code subject, passing through a metamorphosis and a process of both de-subjectivation and neo-subjectivation. In this transition we can identify parts of former subjectivity - the doctor, the worker, the white man, the human being - and some of the new one - the homosexual, the trans-gender, the foolish man, the analyst. It is therefore not possible to locate one single typical revolutionary man, but multiple individual and/or group connections in schizo- revolutionary processes. What revolution really requires, according to Guattari, is an experimental revolutionary process and not revolutionary subjects tailored by ideology. “Repeated mistakes and insignificant results are more necessary than a stupid passivity and claw back mechanisms.”To deeply understand the concept of the revolutionary man as intended by Deleuze we need to look at Klossowski again and in particular to his speech at the Collége de Philosophie in Paris during a conference entitled Nietzsche, Polytheism and Parody in 1957. Klossowski was considered one of the central figures in French Nietzsche’s studies, especially after his masterful translation of Nietzsche’s The Gay Science in 1954. In this speech Klossowski underlines the figure of the «actor as interpreter of a celestial revelation» able to contrast the catechontic institutions with artistic antinomic «accelerated» creations: “But art has a very wide meaning, and in Nietzsche, this category includes institutions as much as works of free creation. For example - and
here we can see immediately what is at issue-
how does Nietzsche consider the Church?
For him, the Church is constituted grosso
modo by a cast of profound impostors:
the priests. The Church is a masterpiece
of spiritual domination, and it required
that impossible plebian monk, Luther, to
dream of ruining that masterpiece, the last
edifice of Roman civilization among us. The
admiration Nietzsche always had for the
Church and the papacy rests precisely upon
the idea that truth is an error, and that art,
as willed error, is higher than truth. This
is why Zarathustra confesses his affinity
with the priest, and why, in the Fourth
Part, during that extraordinary gathering
of the different kinds of higher men in
Zarathustra's cave, the Pope -the Last Pope-
is one of the prophet's guests of honor. This
betrays, I think, Nietzsche's temptation
to foresee a ruling class of great meta-
psychologists who would take charge of
the destinies of future humanity, since they
would know perfectly both the different
aspirations and the different resources
capable of satisfying them. (NPP; 106, 107)
What he is saying is that Nietzsche at the
end of the 80’s of the XIX century had
already understood that the Great Politics
needed an entertainment sphere where
institutions, dominating castes, gregarious
masses could express a certain will to
power. Deleuze admires Klossowski and his
Nietzsche (as he will write in a letter sent
to him in December 1969) and will retrieve
the concept of acceleration of processes of
a community of irregulars who confound
all codes, thus entwining Klossowski-
Nietzsche’s conspirative theory with the
political riots of the 70’s in France. Their
alliance is clearly detected in the talks at
the famous meeting of Cerisy-la-Salle in
July 1972 where Klossowski defines the
fragment entitled The Strong of the Future
- 9 [153] - as the «heart of conspiracy».
After he has finished reading the fragment
he poses a question wondering what
Nietzschean comportment we would adopt
in relation to the current upheavals -
namely youth poverty, revolutionary riots,
clashes between the adverse forces - "no
longer from the point of view of power but
from the perspective of the vicious circle”
to conclude that he would support the
comportment "of the vicious circle, seen
as a manifestation of the nihilist judgment
passed upon all acting." (CV, 38)
Klossowski, choosing the comportment of the nihilist judgment, reaffirms Nietzsche’s parodistic behaviour on the economic planetary planning scenario and again he reminds an attentive audience - Deleuze, Lyotard, Derrida, Calasso and Nancy - the thought of eternal return: “As I have insisted, this thought, as the theme of Nietzsche’s highest contemplation, becomes the instrument of conspiracy. It is from this stage that the god of the vicious circle can truly be considered the blossoming of a delusion. The question that I now pose is whether delusory or deranged behaviour, in this sense, when confronted with reality, can become in any way efficacious, or if, more generally,
Klossowski, choosing the comportment of the nihilist judgment, reaffirms Nietzsche’s parodistic behaviour on the economic planetary planning scenario and again he reminds an attentive audience - Deleuze, Lyotard, Derrida, Calasso and Nancy - the thought of eternal return: “As I have insisted, this thought, as the theme of Nietzsche’s highest contemplation, becomes the instrument of conspiracy. It is from this stage that the god of the vicious circle can truly be considered the blossoming of a delusion. The question that I now pose is whether delusory or deranged behaviour, in this sense, when confronted with reality, can become in any way efficacious, or if, more generally,
any deranged comportment might be said
to constitute an efficient resistance in the
face of a determined adverse force.”(CV,
38) According to Klossowski, Nietzsche
moves from the position of the biological
contemplative observer of the law of the
Eternal Return to the one of the strong
political watcher, thus building - employing
Deleuze and Guattari terminology - a real
war machine so to be able to transform
the Eternal Return into a conspiracy which
should subvert the current domination of
the levelled industrialized man. But why
should such conspiracy be delirious? For
at least two reasons: the first one because
the double parody of the current social
model and of its simulacrum subvert all
codes, as a consequence of the nihilist
judgment passed upon all acting. The second
reason is linked to Deleuze and Guattari’s
interpretation of the post-68 revolutionary
riots: “Delirium is the general matrix of
every unconscious social investment.
Every unconscious investment mobilizes
a delirious interplay of disinvestments, of
counterinvestments, of overinvestments”.
(AO, 277) Similarly Klossowski’s delirium -
the radical departing from the established
path - coincides with the delirious polarity
in Anti-Œdipus: if every social investment
is delirious, the same will be for a no
longer secret conspiracy plotted by idle
urban dissidents whose aim justifies and
realizes itself through the same means
of manifestation. The question at this
stage is about fulfillment: can the schizo-delirious approach be incisive both in the
revolutionary riots of the ‘70s and on a any
other future moment to come, as the law
of the Vicious Circle seem to suggest? In
Klossowski words the question is: does the
schizo delirious process simply represent
the current version of the Vicious Circle
or are we in front of a general peremptory
coherent identity between Process, Circle
and Return?
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