Visualizzazione post con etichetta Crack Capitalism. Mostra tutti i post
Visualizzazione post con etichetta Crack Capitalism. Mostra tutti i post

lunedì 17 agosto 2015

Joseph E. Stiglitz: Towards a General Theory of Deep Downturns @ Economist's View 17Ago2015 by Mark Thoma


This is the abstract, introduction, and final section of a recent paper by Joe Stiglitz on theoretical models of deep depressions (as he notes, it's "an extension of the Presidential Address to the International Economic Association"):
Towards a General Theory of Deep Downturns, by Joseph E. Stiglitz, NBER Working Paper No. 21444, August 2015

Abstract This paper, an extension of the Presidential Address to the International Economic Association, evaluates alternative strands of macro-economics in terms of the three basic questions posed by deep downturns: What is the source of large perturbations? How can we explain the magnitude of volatility? How do we explain persistence? The paper argues that while real business cycles and New Keynesian theories with nominal rigidities may help explain certain historical episodes, alternative strands of New Keynesian economics focusing on financial market imperfections, credit, and real rigidities provides a more convincing interpretation of deep downturns, such as the Great Depression and the Great Recession, giving a more plausible explanation of the origins of downturns, their depth and duration. Since excessive credit expansions have preceded many deep downturns, particularly important is an understanding of finance, the credit creation process and banking, which in a modern economy are markedly different from the way envisioned in more traditional models.
Introduction The world has been plagued by episodic deep downturns. The crisis that began in 2008 in the United States was the most recent, the deepest and longest in three quarters of a century. It came in spite of alleged “better” knowledge of how our economic system works, and belief among many that we had put economic fluctuations behind us. Our economic leaders touted the achievement of the Great Moderation.[2] As it turned out, belief in those models actually contributed to the crisis. It was the assumption that markets were efficient and self-regulating and that economic actors had the ability and incentives to manage their own risks that had led to the belief that self-regulation was all that was required to ensure that the financial system worked well , an d that there was no need to worry about a bubble . The idea that the economy could, through diversification, effectively eliminate risk contributed to complacency — even after it was evident that there had been a bubble. Indeed, even after the bubble broke, Bernanke could boast that the risks were contained.[3] These beliefs were supported by (pre-crisis) DSGE models — models which may have done well in more normal times, but had little to say about crises. Of course, almost any “decent” model would do reasonably well in normal times. And it mattered little if, in normal times , one model did a slightly better job in predicting next quarter’s growth. What matters is predicting — and preventing — crises, episodes in which there is an enormous loss in well-being. These models did not see the crisis coming, and they had given confidence to our policy makers that, so long as inflation was contained — and monetary authorities boasted that they had done this — the economy would perform well. At best, they can be thought of as (borrowing the term from Guzman (2014) “models of the Great Moderation,” predicting “well” so long as nothing unusual happens. More generally, the DSGE models have done a poor job explaining the actual frequency of crises.[4]
Of course, deep downturns have marked capitalist economies since the beginning. It took enormous hubris to believe that the economic forces which had given rise to crises in the past were either not present, or had been tamed, through sound monetary and fiscal policy.[5] It took even greater hubris given that in many countries conservatives had succeeded in dismantling the regulatory regimes and automatic stabilizers that had helped prevent crises since the Great Depression. It is noteworthy that my teacher, Charles Kindleberger, in his great study of the booms and panics that afflicted market economies over the past several hundred years had noted similar hubris exhibited in earlier crises. (Kindleberger, 1978)
Those who attempted to defend the failed economic models and the policies which were derived from them suggested that no model could (or should) predict well a “once in a hundred year flood.” But it was not just a hundred year flood — crises have become common . It was not just something that had happened to the economy. The crisis was man-made — created by the economic system. Clearly, something is wrong with the models.
Studying crises is important, not just to prevent these calamities and to understand how to respond to them — though I do believe that the same inadequate models that failed to predict the crisis also failed in providing adequate responses. (Although those in the US Administration boast about having prevented another Great Depression, I believe the downturn was certainly far longer, and probably far deeper, than it need to have been.) I also believe understanding the dynamics of crises can provide us insight into the behavior of our economic system in less extreme times.
This lecture consists of three parts. In the first, I will outline the three basic questions posed by deep downturns. In the second, I will sketch the three alternative approaches that have competed with each other over the past three decades, suggesting that one is a far better basis for future research than the other two. The final section will center on one aspect of that third approach that I believe is crucial — credit. I focus on the capitalist economy as a credit economy , and how viewing it in this way changes our understanding of the financial system and monetary policy. ...
He concludes with:
IV. The crisis in economics The 2008 crisis was not only a crisis in the economy, but it was also a crisis for economics — or at least that should have been the case. As we have noted, the standard models didn’t do very well. The criticism is not just that the models did not anticipate or predict the crisis (even shortly before it occurred); they did not contemplate the possibility of a crisis, or at least a crisis of this sort. Because markets were supposed to be efficient, there weren’t supposed to be bubbles. The shocks to the economy were supposed to be exogenous: this one was created by the market itself. Thus, the standard model said the crisis couldn’t or wouldn’t happen ; and the standard model had no insights into what generated it.
Not surprisingly, as we again have noted, the standard models provided inadequate guidance on how to respond. Even after the bubble broke, it was argued that diversification of risk meant that the macroeconomic consequences would be limited. The standard theory also has had little to say about why the downturn has been so prolonged: Years after the onset of the crisis, large parts of the world are operating well below their potential. In some countries and in some dimension, the downturn is as bad or worse than the Great Depression. Moreover, there is a risk of significant hysteresis effects from protracted unemployment, especially of youth.
The Real Business Cycle and New Keynesian Theories got off to a bad start. They originated out of work undertaken in the 1970s attempting to reconcile the two seemingly distant branches of economics, macro-economics, centering on explaining the major market failure of unemployment, and microeconomics, the center piece of which was the Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics, demonstrating the efficiency of markets.[66] Real Business Cycle Theory (and its predecessor, New Classical Economics) took one route: using the assumptions of standard micro-economics to construct an analysis of the aggregative behavior of the economy. In doing so, they left Hamlet out of the play: almost by assumption unemployment and other market failures didn’t exist. The timing of their work couldn’t have been worse: for it was just around the same time that economists developed alternative micro-theories, based on asymmetric information, game theory, and behavioral economics, which provided better explanations of a wide range of micro-behavior than did the traditional theory on which the “new macro - economics” was being constructed. At the same time, Sonnenschein (1972) and Mantel (1974) showed that the standard theory provided essentially no structure for macro- economics — essentially any demand or supply function could have been generated by a set of diverse rational consumers. It was the unrealistic assumption of the representative agent that gave theoretical structure to the macro-economic models that were being developed. (As we noted, New Keynesian DSGE models were but a simple variant of these Real Business Cycles, assuming nominal wage and price rigidities — with explanations, we have suggested, that were hardly persuasive.)
There are alternative models to both Real Business Cycles and the New Keynesian DSGE models that provide better insights into the functioning of the macroeconomy, and are more consistent with micro- behavior, with new developments of micro-economics, with what has happened in this and other deep downturns . While these new models differ from the older ones in a multitude of ways, at the center of these models is a wide variety of financial market imperfections and a deep analysis of the process of credit creation. These models provide alternative (and I believe better) insights into what kinds of macroeconomic policies would restore the economy to prosperity and maintain macro-stability.
This lecture has attempted to sketch some elements of these alternative approaches. There is a rich research agenda ahead.

Read more @ EV blog 

martedì 1 ottobre 2013

COSTAS LAPAVITSAS: FINANCIALIZATION IN CRISIS @ Haymarket, May 2013


FINANCIALIZATION IN CRISIS

edited by COSTAS LAPAVITSAS
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In this important and timely volume, a number of well-known political economists draw on the insights of Marxist and other heterodox economists to argue that the turmoil of 2007 to 2009 represents a crisis of financialized capitalism that can only be understood through tracing out the structural changes in the modern global economy. Carefully examining domestic and international aspects of the financialization of capitalism over the past thirty years, the contributors persuasively demonstrate that the ongoing economic crisis commenced in the sphere of finance, spread to production, and then became a world recession.

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Costas Lapavitsas is Professor of Economics at the School of Oriental and African Studies. He has published extensively on the political economy of money and finance. His publications include Social Foundations of Markets, Money and Credit. 

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With Contributions From:
Carlos Morera Camacho • Paulo L. Dos Santos • Gary Dymski • Nuray Ergüneş • Makoto Itoh • Costas Lapavitsas • Juan Pablo Painceira • Demophanos Papadatos • José Antonio Rojas Nieto

lunedì 29 aprile 2013

Lapo Berti - La felicità perduta - Luiss University Press, It, 2013




Il tema della “economia della felicità” è sempre di maggiore attualità. 
Una crisi finanziaria dalle conseguenze devastanti ha mostrato quanto poco la politica sia attualmente in grado di controllare i processi economici. Il deterioramento dei contesti sociali unito al diffuso peggioramento delle aspettative fanno il resto. Rimettere in discussione gli obiettivi tradizionalmente perseguiti è a questo punto, un passaggio necessario e non rinviabile.
E’ ora necessario chiedersi se l’obiettivo della crescita ininterrotta della ricchezza sia in effetti quello più appropriato per apportare alle persone ciò che, da sempre, i politici dichiarano di voler perseguire: la maggiore felicità possibile per il più gran numero possibile di individui.



Sinossi
Di fronte alla sempre più manifesta e drammatica incapacità dei sistemi politici di venire incontro alle aspettative, se non addirittura ai bisogni primari della maggior parte dei cittadini, è necessario tornare a interrogarsi in maniera radicale su ciò che conferisce senso alla vita individuale e collettiva. Il tema della felicità e della sua ricerca, solo apparentemente semplice e banale, mette alla prova tutte le nostre conoscenze disciplinari, dalla biologia alla neurologia, dall'antropologia alla psicologia, dalla filosofia all'economia, alla politica, nel tentativo di mettere a nudo il senso profondo della nostra esistenza o, se si preferisce, ciò che caratterizza, in maniera unica e specifica, la condizione umana. Attento in particolare alle implicazioni del tema per il discorso economico, l'Autore risponde con linguaggio semplice a quesiti complessi come quelli legati al significato da attribuire al termine “felicità”, alla necessità di parlare di felicità individuale o collettiva, o ancora all'unitarietà e omogeneità di ciò che procura felicità o della sua articolazione e varietà, realizzando un'opera al tempo stesso appassionante e accessibile ma anche in grado di contribuire in modo significativo alla ricerca sul tema.


Lapo Berti, economista, è stato dirigente presso l’Autorità garante della concorrenza e del mercato. È stato docente di Politica economica e finanziaria. Si è occupato di problemi di teoria monetaria e di storia del pensiero economico nonché di politica economica. È autore di L’Antieuropa delle monete (con A. Fumagalli, Il Manifesto 1993) e di Saldi di fine secolo. Le privatizzazioni in Italia (Ediesse, 1998). Più di recente ha pubblicato Il mercato oltre le ideologie (Università Bocconi Editore, 2006), Le stagioni dell'antitrust (con Andrea Pezzoli,Università Bocconi Editore 2010) e Trattatello sulla felicità (LUISS University Press, 2013).


Read more on LUP website

The Italian Miracle by Paul Krugman @ NYTimes.com - April 29, 2013




The Italian Miracle

by Paul Krugman

@ NYTimes.com / Read more

April 29, 2013

Italy is a mess. Yes, it has a prime minister, finally; but the chances of serious economic reform are minimal, the willingness to persist in ever-harsher austerity — which the Rehns of this world tell us is essential — is evaporating. It’s all bad. But a funny thing is happening:

What’s going on here? I think that we’re seeing strong evidence for the De Grauwe view that soaring rates in the European periphery had relatively little to do with solvency concerns, and were instead a case of market panic made possible by the fact that countries that joined the euro no longer had a lender of last resort, and were subject to potential liquidity crises.
What’s happened now is that the ECB sounds increasingly willing to act as the necessary lender, and that in general the softening of austerity rhetoric makes it seem less likely that Italy will be forced into default by sheer shortage of cash. Hence, falling yields and much-reduced pressure.
It also, to be a bit self-justifying, shows that back when I used to cite Italy in the 1990s as an example of how advanced countries can carry high debt loads, I wasn’t being naive. Back then Italy had its own currency, and debt denominated in that currency; yes, it was pegged to the Deutsche Mark, but there was always the option of unpegging. By joining the euro, Italy in effect turned itself, macroeconomically, into a third-world country with debts in someone else’s currency, and exposed itself to debt crisis; now, thanks to the Draghi put, it has stepped half way back into the first world.

lunedì 15 aprile 2013

John Daniel Taylor - Debt: An Idiot’s Guide to Defaulting the Future @ Drowned and Saved blog, March 9, 2013


Debt: An Idiot’s Guide to Defaulting the Future
by John Daniel Taylor @ Drowned and Saved (this is the Chapter 4 of the book Negative Capitalism)

Negative capitalism generates its own ontological experience, embodied in Foucault’s description of a new ‘homo œconomicus‘, man as entrepreneur of himself, ‘being for himself his own capital, being for himself his own producer’.[1] Gary Becker too abstracts social and family life into machinic ‘human capital’.[2] Or think of that even more dreary contemporary term of ‘human resources’ in the modern corporation.The popularity of the BBC show The Apprentice with computer salesman Sir Alan Sugar gives the lie that each of us can make it big with the right amount of pluck and entrepreneurial determination. The general sleaziness, arrogance, and fundamental lack of social skills and intelligence of most contestants on this show demonstrate that the homo œconomicus, the man or woman of the neoliberal era, is a dangerous idiot. The show’s contestants are entertaining rather than inspirational, and one’s alienated enjoyment of these greedy and foolish characters masks how being entrepreneurial is increasingly a feature of daily working life, as managers impress upon workers the need to become more productive and develop their human capital for the organisation. But if financial capital’s power is now dependent on life itself to be economically productive and consent to its processes, then life itself – you and I – possess the democratic potential to say no, to draw on the negative and think and behave in entirely foreign ways to neoliberal capital.
Debt is both a means of control of the individual’s time and possibilities, and an exciting vulnerability within financial capitalism. The processes of neoliberalism have led to a negation of wealth into abstracted finance, the production of goods into services, politics into marketing, social relations into economic relations, and time into debt. Negative capitalism facilitates this increasingly sped-up capitalism through a negation of time into an endless present, a flattening of disciplinary space so that work, socialising, pornography and shopping increasingly happen in one universal location, often the small black screens on our walls or in our very hands, whilst the political agency and economic rights of the worker are increasingly negated. Being in perpetual debt means that one’s time spent not being productive is costly: how much interest has accumulated in this time on my debts? How much longer must I now work to catch up? Negative capitalism sustains itself through debt which in turn invests and colonises all future earnings, which are plunged into debt repayments, leading to new increasing symptoms of anxiety and depression in the UK. This anxiety is then manipulated by concerns over ‘security’ to generate new control architectures of surveillance and databases across the UK. But until now there has been no cohesive suggestion of a mass debt-strike. Rather than ever being vulnerable to the increasing interest rates of creditors and the increasing enclosure of public property by the markets, what if all those indebted were to strike back by refusing the only thing capital might need of them, debt?
A ‘man is no longer a man confined but a man in debt’: so Deleuze remarks in his “Postscript on Control Societies”.[3]The exercise of neoliberal theory into practice has largely been determined by debt, where after reaching the status of influential idea it was parachuted into the debt crises of New York City (1976), the United Kingdom (1978-9), Latin America (1982) and others. Neoliberalisation is a process that transforms all social and political relations into economic relations, conforming with Deleuze’s notion of the individual abstracted into a ‘dividual’, void of social content except economically-useful data.[4] Data is information, the basis of its own ‘information economy’, in effect a commodity – and when money is abstracted into financial capital, wage becomes a form of credit that workers sell in order to sustain present spending. By getting into debt, and in effect becoming credit commodities bought and sold by larger credit magnates – the worker becomes abstracted of future potential, their future time sold for a payment, that is, the debt to be repaid. Debt is paradigmatic of neoliberal control, the chief means by which subjects – be they individuals, businesses, or sovereign states – become subordinated and intrinsically controlled. Debt becomes an enclosure of the commons, what Steven Shaviro describes as a colonisation of the future, as individuals can no longer study, shop or afford to live in many urban areas without recourse to loans or credit cards.[5]
Debt on a mass scale has sustained and made possible the neoliberal project. In the UK, neoliberalism has been largely premised on huge national borrowing and a deregulation of credit controls, flooding the market consumers with cheap credit which has largely supplemented stagnating real wages and increasing poverty during this time.[6]As Marazzi argues, the servicing of debt has been a major commodity and source of disproportionate capital accumulation over the neoliberal era.[7] Post-Fordist financial capitalism has been presented with a problem of how to continue economic growth and production without producing further goods, resulting in what Deleuze calls a ‘metaproduction’ of financial speculation.[8]Marazzi’s research finds that economic growth over the last twenty years has been based on a manipulation of mortgage loans and re-mortgaging, effectively allowing home-owners access to cheaper and cheaper credit.[9]Post-Fordist growth has therefore become based on ‘non-wage incomes’, a somewhat euphemistic reference to debt, whereby losses are socialised (national debt, austerity) and benefits are privatised (bankers’ bonuses, MPs expenses, unpaid taxes).[10] Ultimately Western economies become ensnared in this speculative logic of borrowing and debt, where the powerful have a vested interest in maintaining the continued financialisation of everyday life by capital mechanisms. Public services are privatised; welfare-users and school-children become customers; whilst the final marks of citizenship (public service, safety) are replaced by CCTV and advertisements, the final form of civic information.
Debt also sustains and, in a very limited and problematic way, empowers many to participate in a consumer economy that would otherwise exclude the impoverished. Being in debt or depending on overdrafts and credit have become entirely normal in working-class and middle-class British life, but why has no-one stopped to ask what debt means? If it’s a sacrifice of the future to sustain the present, why does one need to replace one debt with another on a regular basis? What was the original source of crisis that required one to sell one’s future labour for credit in today’s currency, and was this crisis fair, or were each of us taken advantage of? Ivor Southwood describes how debt is the closest thing to a collective identity the British people have, aside from a fear of terrorism.[11]What if the collectivity of indebted British workers were not dupes of persuasive credit card schemes, but forced into debt by unfair economic circumstances which rightly need to be rectified? Beyond individual debt, this language of debt and the necessity for cuts has become a new ideology: the national debt is now used to justify political and economic restructuring in language of ‘sacrifice’. David Graeber has noted that much of the US debt is in fact owed to the Federal Reserve, effectively itself – interestingly the Federal Reserve was the engine of neoliberalism in the United States under Volcker.[12]Shaviro too argues that the ‘free market’ indeed forces us to be ‘free’: to cooperate in its price system as rational, efficient, “dynamic” individuals – a freedom which is increasingly based on credit to afford education, housing and consumer items.[13]This creates another experience of time beyond that of sheer instantaneity: the time of debt is one that extends into the future, speculating its own value that ‘ravages the present in the name of a future that will never actually arrive; and it depletes our hopes for, and imaginings of, the future by turning it into nothing but a projection and endless repetition of the present’.[14]Debt has individually and socially become the pretext for further intrusions, demanding ever further sacrifices, for debts which no-one is ever realistically expected to repay, but must strive to do so all the same.
Private debt links the contemporary neoliberal worker with the citizen of the earlier democracies: it allows us to purchase what was once common and accessible by ‘social rent’ – decent housing, basic appliances and media devices, some kind of full-time employment.[15]Sean O’Connell’s historical research into debt in working-class British communities found it to be a regular feature of working-class life long before the credit card. Working-class households, often led by women, have negotiated debt first with credit drapers, then mail-order catalogues, and now via the boom in doorstep moneylending since the 1980s onwards, as many became ‘credit orphans’ following increasing credit rating exclusions and deregulation.[16] The ‘personal finance industry’ and the no-win-no-fee insurance industries dominate television advertising during daytime hours when largely those unemployed, ill or caring for children will be watching TV, offering cheap loans, or advertising shops like Cash Converters or Bright House which have increasingly replaced the pawn-shop (and whose online store locator maps offer a topography of national poverty).[17]Perhaps the difference here is the recent phenomenon of both middle-class debt and national debt.
In a sense, neoliberalism was always predicated on a cheap trick, underscored by military power: allow workers to maintain living standards via cheap credit whilst wages in real-terms fall. As Graeber notes, money has always been something that never specifically existed, but has been a historical relation between banks and states seeking to pay for war.[18]The decision by US President Richard Nixon to end the fixed convertibility of gold to US Dollars on 15 August 1971, terminating the global Bretton Woods agreement, was forced in order to continue the hugely expensive Indochina wars. The postwar Keynesian consensus had guaranteed full employment, expanding public services and inclusive education on the unwritten ‘agreement’ that workers would continue increasing productivity, accede to modernising labour practices, and that unions would regulate workforces to manage discipline. The collapse of this Fordist consensus is marked here: when productivity stagnates, Western economic hegemony is challenged. Post-Fordist financial credit, premised on debt, was a breakthrough that living standards could temporarily be maintained or frozen, through access to cheap credit – buy now and pay later become the policy of both individuals and national governments, a temporary political quick-fix at the time to guarantee backing from powerful capitalists in exchange for tax breaks. Margaret Thatcher’s premiership demonstrates this in two ways: the support of the wealthy was assured immediately upon being elected in 1979, when she cut the personal income tax rate from 83% to 60%, whilst nearly doubling VAT from 8% to 15%, and cutting social spending; whilst she was able to temporarily buy public support through the sale of council houses to owners in the UK during the 1980s.[19] Obtaining credit was essential to continue purchasing basic items as prices rapidly rose through increased inflation and VAT. Thirty years on, decades of underfunded infrastructure is visible in the rotten, negated state of individuals, schools, housing, healthcare and communities. War becomes a powerful way of asserting Western hegemony whilst managing domestic unrest at home, with Pasquinelli arguing that it ‘has a distinctly cathartic role for the libido of a nation’.[20]Thatcher’s deregulation of credit controls in the 1980s gave new access to credit, and a short-term income was generated for many in buying and then subsequently selling (or sub-letting) council flats, but it took the controversial Falklands-Malvinas war of 1982 to establish real political support for Thatcher during a period of shrinking wages, rising inflation and unemployment, and overall social decline.[21]
A new economic and political identity was forged in the neoliberal era: ‘Thatcherism’ and ‘Reaganism’ converged on a right-wing religious morality of restrictive family values alongside neoliberal free markets. Corporations were free whilst individuals and trade unions became heavily restricted and regulated. The current effects of the neoliberal project demand that less employed workers work for longer hours, resulting in increasing productivity as before but with far cheaper and more disempowered labour. The decline of the social state, unwilling but also unable to provide infrastructure due to declining tax revenues from the wealthy, and at the mercy inevitably of credit rating agencies (Fitch, Moody’s, and Standard & Poor’s have become the king-makers of contemporary global politics), suggests private financial interests and stakeholders may be demanded to assume political control, given their possession of economic and therefore social power already. The question is whether citizens will have the strategy to take responsibility for their own decisions. Will obesity, depression, war and alcohol/drug dependency prove effective contraception to a new social democratic movement that might destroy its own indebted servitude?
The manipulation of debt during the neoliberal era has offset future production to abortively sustain contemporary consumerism – an effective sale of future labour, the ultimate speculation and permeation of life by capital. This can be understood in the looming £191billion debt that students will owe by 2047, according to latest government estimates, a figure which has already risen from the £67billion estimate last year.[22]Find evidence of this in the increasing capital imbalance between capital-accumulating states (China, India, the oil-producing states) and capital-borrowing states (US, UK, Ireland and the southern Eurozone states), which has required these states to effectively guarantee through credit and bond-purchases the unsustainable consumerism and public expenditure of the citizens and governments of these indebted states.[23]In many ways debt has unnaturally allowed consumption and economic production in declining states, a temporary economic solution which defers bankruptcy or social collapse to an abandoned future – “when the shit hits the fan, we won’t be in government”. Keynesianism has the capacity to redirect state expenditure into socially munificent projects but this required precisely the international Bretton Woods international banking agreement dissolved in 1971. National currencies no longer have the power or ability to protect themselves against central banks and credit markets, and it is only military power that confirms the UK and the US as independent and powerful forces when their own currencies and economies are in such indebted, deregulated and hence uncontrollable disarray. Global financial exchange is underscored by nothing except the abstract debts of its workers, an abstract debt which would be fictitious were it not brutally underscored by bailiffs, police forces and national military machines.Thus debt has sustained impossible levels of consumption in declining states, a temporary economic solution which defers bankruptcy and social collapse to some unknown point in an increasingly unlikely and ruined future.
Despite various attempts at economic stimulus since 2008, the global debt crisis is again flaring up in the collapse of the Eurozone and further collapse of American currency markets, with rounds of ‘quantitative easing’ compounding the fact that money is now largely fictional, speculative and based on no value apart from the hegemonic power of those who issue it.At this stage, the only option for most western economies is to go into further sovereign debt (by selling bonds), whilst encouraging consumers to do the same. Whilst China may be behind many of the loans, negative capitalism has no responsible sovereign. The terrifying spectre haunting the neoliberal era is universal debt, with no obvious creditor, and no possible means of ever repaying a debt owed. The more literary readings of Marx’s works have attended to his metaphors of spectres, vampires, and the undead in his descriptions of capital.[24]Another spectre looming behind this is perhaps ‘zombie banks’, inflated by state capital to continue appearing as functioning, lending banks when in fact their activities or independence have long been nil, another iconic contradiction of the neoliberal era.[25]
Is capital itself undead, one that has deferred its imminent organic death by structural contradiction by a Frankenstein-like appearance of life as debt? Perhaps it is not capital which is undead, but workers, ‘life’, neither alive nor dead but abstracted, negated and organised into financial streams which are used to afford a decreasingly minimal basic biopolitical support – precarious labour, declining infrastructure, reduction of agency to forged consent, reduction of public spaces to privatised control. Negative capitalism abstracts all labour-relations into debt-creditor relations, where most workers are entirely disempowered and limited by their debts to maintain membership and complicity in a system of capitalist accumulation which they gain no real benefit from, and which many cynically admit is a rigged show. To compound the Kafkaesque ‘indefinite postponement’, there is increasingly no possibility for many nation-states of becoming bankrupt either.[26]Perhaps only a campaign of systematic mass-bankruptcies and hacking into financial systems and currency markets will effect some kind of redress of this negation of future and labour-in-potential by debt.
Picblog: Leland Bobbé (New York in the Seventies) 
References
[1] Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, 147, 226, 269, 278.
[2] Indicated by Gary Becker’s pioneering work, Human Capital, 1964; see also Theodor Schultz, Investing in Human Capital, 1971.
[3] Deleuze, “Postscript”, Negotiations, 181.
[4] Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, 57-67; Deleuze, “Postscript”, Negotiations, 179-180.
[5] Steven R. Shaviro, “The ‘Bitter Necessity’ of Debt: Neoliberal Finance and the Society of Control”, Paper presented at Debt Conference April 29-May 1 2010, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 8-9.
[6] The High Pay Commission, Director’s Pensions: in it for themselves? (London: High Pay Commission, 2011), 4-7; High Pay Commission, More for Less: what has happened to pay at the top and does it matter? (London: High Pay Commission, 2011), 5-9; Wenchao Jin, Robert Joyce, David Phillips and Luke Sibieta, Poverty and Inequality in the UK: 2011. IFS Commentary C118(London: Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2011), 1-3.
[7] Marazzi, Violence, 33-37, 40-42.
[8] Deleuze, “Postscript”, Negotiations, 181.
[9] Marazzi, Violence, 25, 33-34.
[10] Marazzi, Violence, 47.
[11] Ivor Southwood, Non-Stop Inertia (Winchester, UK; Washington, USA: Zero Books, 2011)11.
[12] David Graeber, “The Debt is Not Nearly as Scary as You Think”, 21st April 2011, New York Daily News. See also Harvey,Brief History of Neoliberalism, 1-2.
[13] Shaviro, “’Bitter Necessity’ of Debt”, 8.
[14] Shaviro, “’Bitter Necessity’”, 9.
[15] Marazzi, Violence, 94-95.
[16] Sean O’Connell, Credit and Community: Working-Class Debt in the UK Since 1880 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 50-52, 90, 127.
[17] O’Connell, Credit and Community, 188-191.
[18] Graeber, Debt: The First 5,000 Years (New York: Melville House, 2011), 361, 364, 372. On the cultural expense of the military, see Peter Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason, trans. Michael Eldred (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 323.
[19] Graeber, Debt, 375-376.
[20] Pasquinelli, Animal Spirits, 168.
[21] O’Connell, Credit and Community, 6, 91.
[22] Sarah Morrison and Brian Brady “Student debt will soar to £200bn, official figures show”, Independent on Sunday, 21 August 2011.
[23] Castells, Rise of the Network Society, xix.
[24] Marx frequently refers to zombies, vampires and the supernatural – see Karl Marx, Capital. A Critique of Political Economy. Vol. 1. (trans. Ben Fowkes. London: Penguin, 1990), 163, 176, 189, 255, 342, 416, 502-503, 548.
[25] On ‘zombie banks’ see Tyler Cowen, “Euro vs. Invasion of the Zombie Banks”, New York Times, April 17 2011.
[26] Every ‘outside’ is now within and ‘inside’ capitalist accumulation – even bankruptcy functions inside accumulation, leading to an infinite regression of debt. See Marazzi, Violence, 109-111.

J.D. Taylor - Negative Capitalism: Cynicism in the Neoliberal Era - Zero Books, Usa, 29 March 2013


Negative Capitalism: Cynicism in the Neoliberal Era offers a new conceptual framework for understanding the current economic crisis. Through a ranging series of analyses and perspectives, it argues that cynicism has become culturally embedded in the UK and US as an effect of disempowerment by neoliberal capitalism. Yet despite the deprivation and collapse of key social infrastructure like representative democracy, welfare, workers' rights and equal access to resources, there has so far been no collective, effective and sustained overthrow of capitalism. Why is this? The book's central call is for new strategies that unravel this narcissistic cynicism, embracing social democracy, constitutional rights, mass bankruptcies and animate sabotage. Kafka, Foucault, Ballard and de Sade are clashed with the X-Factor, ruinporn, London, and the artwork of Laura Oldfield Ford. Negative Capitalism's polemic is written to incite responses against the cynical malaise of the neoliberal era.

J.D. Taylor is a writer and community worker from south London. His experiences come from three years' frontline working in various charities and community support services, as well as a Cultural Studies MA from Goldsmiths. Working under various pseudonyms as an active participant in the contemporary anti-cuts movement, he was also taught by Mark Fisher in the FE college which provides much of the empirical basis of his 'Capitalist Realism'. He writes on politics, cultural studies, philosophy and fiction at drownedandsaved.wordpress.com, and Nyx, a Noctournal (www.nyxnoctournal.org), which he also co-edits.


  • Negative Capitalism represents a new generation of critique by what I've termed graduates without a future. Taylor brings together incisive and provocative analysis alongside personal experience to explore how debt, cynicism, smartphones, psychopharmacology, underemployment and neoliberalism all represent a new era of negation. In a time of economic meltdown and mass struggle, this book offers one way out of the current crisis. ~ Paul Mason, BBC Newsnight Economics Editor and author of Why It's Kicking Off Everywhere, and Meltdown
  • The seriously researched sections on London and gentrification, class and the riots, Ruin Porn and DIY Porn, the brave and risky notes on fascism, and the intriguing practical proposals near the end all really stand out. ~ Owen Hatherley, author of Uncommon and A Guide to the New Ruins of Great Britain, email
  • Negative Capitalism is a timely reminder of how a logic of negation is as central to an analysis of culture, politics, and the economy as it is to the machinations of capital itself. ~ Eugene Thacker, author of In The Dust Of This Planet - Horror of Philosophy, vol. 1, Email
  • Read more on Zero Books

mercoledì 6 febbraio 2013

Franco Berardi - The Uprising On Poetry and Finance - Semiotext(e), Usa, 13 Nov 2012




The Uprising

On Poetry and Finance

Franco “Bifo” Berardi


The Uprising is an Autonomist manifesto for today’s precarious times, and a rallying cry in the face of the catastrophic and irreversible crisis that neoliberalism and the financial sphere have established over the globe. In his newest book, Franco “Bifo” Berardi argues that the notion of economic recovery is complete mythology. The coming years will inevitably see new surges of protest and violence, but the old models of resistance no longer apply. Society can either stick with the prescriptions and “rescues” that the economic and financial sectors have demanded at the expense of social happiness, culture, and the public good; or it can formulate an alternative. For Berardi, this alternative lies in understanding the current crisis as something more fundamental than an economic crisis: it is a crisis of the social imagination, and demands a new language by which to address it.
This is a manifesto against the idea of growth, and against the concept of debt, the financial sector’s two primary linguistic means of manipulating society. It is a call for exhaustion, and for resistance to the cult of energy on which today’s economic free-floating market depends. To this end, Berardi introduces an unexpected linguistic political weapon–poetry: poetry as the insolvency of language, as the sensuous birth of meaning and desire, as that which cannot be reduced to information and exchanged like currency. If the protests now stirring about the world are to take shape and direction, then the revolution will be neither peaceful nor violent–it will be linguistic, or will not be at all.


giovedì 27 dicembre 2012

ECONned How Unenlightened Self Interest Undermined Democracy and Corrupted Capitalism - Yves Smith - Palgrave Macmillan, Usa, October 2011




Why are we in such a financial mess today?  
There are lots of proximate causes: over-leverage, global imbalances, bad financial technology that lead to widespread underestimation of risk.
But these are all symptoms. Until we isolate and tackle fundamental causes, we will fail to extirpate the disease.  ECONned is the first book to examine the unquestioned role of economists as policy-makers, and how they helped create an unmitigated economic disaster.
Here, Yves Smith looks at how economists in key policy positions put doctrine before hard evidence, ignoring the deteriorating conditions and rising dangers that eventually led them, and us, off the cliff and into financial meltdown.  Intelligently written for the layman, Smith takes us on a terrifying investigation of the financial realm over the last twenty-five years of misrepresentations, naive interpretations of economic conditions, rationalizations of bad outcomes, and rejection of clear signs of growing instability. 
In eConned, author Yves Smith reveals:
--why the measures taken by the Obama Administration are mere palliatives and are unlikely to pave the way for a solid recovery
--how economists have come to play a profoundly anti-democratic role in policy
--how financial models and concepts that were discredited more than thirty years ago are still widely used by banks, regulators, and investors
--how management and employees of major financial firms looted them, enriching themselves and leaving the mess  to taxpayers
--how financial regulation enabled predatory behavior by Wall Street towards investors
--how economics has no theory of financial systems, yet economists fearlessly prescribe how to manage them
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sabato 8 dicembre 2012

John Holloway - Crack Capitalism - Derive Approdi, Ita, 2012


«Come cambiare il mondo senza prendere il potere?» si chiedeva il sociologo e militante americano John Holloway nel suo libro più conosciuto. Crack Capitalism ne rappresenta l’approfondita risposta. Una risposta all’apparenza semplice: creando zone di frattura nelle forme di dominio del capitalismo e lasciando che queste fratture si espandano. Secondo Holloway le forme di vita, di relazione, di conflitto, di lavoro che si sottraggono alla logica del capitale non cessano di proliferare. Innumerevoli sono le istanze di produzione di spazi liberi, di spazi della «dignità».
Ma per Holloway si tratta anche di dare a questi spazi una forma che non sia più in alcun modo riconducibile a quella del capitale, dunque una forma quanto più possibile lontana da quello dello Stato.
La nuova grammatica della rivoluzione deve dunque partire dalla forma stessa dell’organizzazione, che è in quanto tale un momento di sottrazione alla dinamica del potere: dalla Comune di Parigi alle asambleas argentine, numerose sono le esperienze storiche e contemporanee a cui guardare. Sono questi momenti quotidiani di ribellione, nei quali sperimentare diverse modi di fare, che rappresentano delle vere e proprie crepe del sistema di sfruttamento.


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