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Visualizzazione post con etichetta Alexandre Kojève. Mostra tutti i post
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mercoledì 2 ottobre 2013
Hager Weslati replies to Giorgio Agamben about Kojeve's memo @ Verso Blog 13 September 2013
Read more @ Verso blog
Agamben claims that the memo was addressed “to the head of the Provisional Government, General Charles de Gaulle.” There is enough evidence to support this claim if a meticulous comparative reading determines how much of Kojeve’s “Esquisse d’une doctrine de la politique francaise” filtered through via numerous bureaucratic routs to the circle of Jean Monnet, or ended up in the Schuman Declaration of May 1950. To this day there is not one single comprehensive study on Kojeve’s key role in French administration and foreign trade diplomacy between 1945 and 1968. There are at least five questions that need to be raised before one comments on the content of Agamben’s “Se un Impero Latino Prendesse Forma Nel Cuore D’Europa” in La Repubblica (15 March 2013), or engages with the provocative “title” of the French version: “Que l’Empire latin contre-attaque!” in Liberation (24 March 2013) Question 1: Who was the addressee of the memo? In the Kojeve archives at the French national library, the folder which contains several versions of the “Esquisse” indicate that the memorandum was addressed to Jean Filippi, at the time, director of economy and finance in the military French government in Baden Baden. Jean Filippi (1905- 1993), occupied several high-ranking positions, namely as secretary-general of economic questions (1941-1942) in the governments of Darlan and Laval. Between 1948 and 1950, he was chief executive of the trade committee (with the European Organisation of Economic Cooperation), then Chief of Staff at the ministry of finance and economic affairs (1949-1950). This particular thread leads all the way back to Kojeve’s early 1940s political writings, part of which directly engage with the flaws in the political project of the Vichy government and its aftermath, including the context of the Resistance, with which he was actively involved as some biographical details seem to indicate. The above mentioned folder also contains a card-note from an unnamed correspondent (possibly Filippi himself, or one of his associates). The note reads as follows: “: you sent me your note two months before the liberation via Mr Jean Cassou. A Latin Union is not realistic. The idea is not original and could be found in many articles of propaganda as in the agreement Mussolini- Laval in 1935. The idea is attractive on paper but it leaves out many minor countries.”In addition, the BNF “Esquisse” folder also includes three intriguing newspaper clips from Le Monde (June- July 1945). The articles outline the position of Great Britain in a nascent new world order, and how it is rebranding itself after the imminent collapse of its empire. Intriguingly, and in each one of those paper clips, Kojeve crosses out “Britain” and replaces it with “France”. There are some entire sentences and a few ideas from the clips reproduced in his “Esquisse” memorandum. There is enough evidence to suggest that Kojeve was fascinated by British diplomacy […] Anecdotal as they may sound, such details are perhaps worth flagging up in order to demystify the “topicality” of the “Latin Empire” as a prophetic document produced in a historical vacuum. Grounding this document in its historical context is crucial to avoid Fukuyamesque misinterpretations of Kojeve (the ones where a concept is lifted out of context and then blindly grafted on a current political situation). To my mind, this is partly the immediate effect of the catchy phrase “Latin Empire” on all those who read Agamben’s short piece in La Republica, reproduced in other European newspapers with even fancier and more aggressive titles. This should lead us to: Question 2: In which context, political and historical, was the memo written? […] If initially the memo was meant to be read by a restricted number of government administrators, the context of its excavation from Kojeve’s papers, and the context of its public dissemination are equally important. On to the next question: Question 3: On which other occasions was Kojeve’s “Latin Empire” used in political debates? The memo first came in the hands of the editors of Grasset (via Dominique Auffret, then Jean-Paul Enthoven and Dominique-Antoine Grisoni). A truncated version of the memo was published in the first issue of La Regle du jeu (May 1990) and was explicitly used to illustrate the aim of the journal: reflecting on a new world order after Soviet communism. Rebranded by Bernard-Henry Levy himself “The Latin Empire”, the “Esquisse” remained within the circle of right and conservative readers for decades. It then appeared in English translation in the Policy Review (n. 126, August 2004) as “Outline of French Policy”, and in Italian translation in Il silenzio della tirannide (edited by Antonio Gnoli. Milan: Aldelphi Edizioni, 2004). Finally, the memo was published in French in the BNF special issue, marking the foundation of the Kojeve Archives (inHommage a Kojeve, BNF, 2007). It is however worth noting that the more than 80 page long memo has never been published in its entirety. What remains to be determined in light of these details is: Question 4: How does the memo read in the context of Kojeve’s political writings (1941- 1945), and in the context of his philosophical system? […] And then: Question 5: How did Agamben paraphrase the content of the memo, and should his paraphrase be considered a “thesis” in its own right? […] After addressing the above listed questions, we can perhaps hope to read useful and engaging comments on Kojeve’s 1945 memo.
Etichette:
Alexandre Kojève,
Europa,
Giorgio Agamben,
Hager Weslati,
Potere
Giorgio Agamben: The Endless Crisis as an Instrument of Power. In conversation with Giorgio Agamben @ Verso website, 04 June 2013 (Original Interview by Dirk Schümer for FAZ)
A Latin empire against the German dominance? The Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben explains his much-discussed thesis. Apparently, he had been misunderstood.
Professor Agamben, when you floated the idea in March of a ‘Latin imperium’ against Germanic domination in Europe, could you have imagined the powerful resonance this contention would have? In the meantime your essay has been translated into countless languages and passionately discussed across half the continent…
No, I didn’t expect this. But I believe in the power of words, when they are spoken at the right time.
Is the fracture in the European Union really between the economies and ways of life of the ‘Germanic’ north and the ‘Latin’ south?
I would like to make clear right away that my thesis has been exaggerated by journalists and therefore misrepresented. Its title, ‘The Latin empire should start a counter-attack’, was supplied by the editors of Libération and was taken up by the German media. It’s not something I ever said. How could I counterpose Latin culture to German, when any intelligent European knows that Italian culture of the Renaissance or the culture of classical Greece is today completely part of German culture, which reconceived it and appropriated it!
So, no dominant ‘Latin empire’? No uncultivated Germans?
In Europe, the identity of every culture always lies at the frontiers. A German such as Winckelmann or Hölderlin could be more Greek than the Greeks. And a Florentine like Dante could feel just as German as the Swabian emperor Frederick II. That is precisely what makes up Europe: a particularity that time and again oversteps national and cultural frontiers. The object of my criticism was not Germany, but rather the way in which the European Union has been constructed, that is, on an exclusively economic basis. So not only have our spiritual and cultural roots been ignored, but also our political and legal ones. If this was heard as a criticism of Germany, it is only because Germany, because of its dominant position and despite its exceptional philosophical tradition, appears unable at the present time to conceive of a Europe based on anything more than just the euro and economics.
In what way has the EU denied its political and legal roots?
When we speak of Europe today, we are faced with the gigantic repression of a painful and yet obvious truth: Europe’s so-called constitution is illegitimate. The text that was put through under this name was never voted by the peoples. Or when it was put to a vote, as in France and the Netherlands in 2005, it was frontally rejected. Legally speaking, therefore, what we have here is not a constitution, but on the contrary a treaty between governments: international law, not constitutional law. Just recently, the very respected German legal scholar Dieter Grimm recalled the fact that a European constitution lacks the fundamental, democratic element, since the European citizens were not allowed to decide on it. And now the whole project of ratification by the peoples has been silently put on ice.
That is indeed the famous ‘democratic deficit’ in the European system…
We shouldn’t lose sight of this. Journalists, particularly in Germany, have reproached me with understanding nothing of democracy, but they should consider first of all that the EU is a community based on treaties between states, and simply disguised with a democratic constitution. The idea of Europe as a constitution-giving power is a spectre that no one ventures to conjure up any more. But only with a valid constitution could European institutions regain their legitimacy.
Does this mean that you see the European Union as an illegal body?
Not illegal, but illegitimate. Legality is a question of the rules of exertion of power; legitimacy is the principle that underlies these rules. Legal treaties are certainly not just formalities, but they reflect a social reality. It is understandable therefore that an institution without a constitution cannot follow a genuine policy, but that each European state continues acting according to its egoistic interest – and today this evidently means above all economic interest. The lowest common denominator of unity is achieved when Europe appears as a vassal of the United States and takes part in wars that in no way lie in the common interest, to say nothing of the will of the people. A number of the founding states of the EU – such as Italy with its many American military bases – are more in the way of protectorates than sovereign states. In politics and militarily there is an Atlantic alliance, but certainly no Europe.
You’d therefore prefer a Latin imperium, whose way of life the ‘Germans’ would have to adapt to, to the EU…
No, it was perhaps rather provocatively that I took up Alexandre Kojève’s project of a ‘Latin imperium’. In the Middle Ages people at least knew that a unity of different political societies had to mean more than a purely political society. At that time, the uniting bond was sought in Christianity. Today I believe that this legitimation must be sought in Europe’s history and its cultural traditions. In contrast to Asians and Americans, for whom history means something completely different, Europeans always encounter their truth in a dialogue with their past. The past for us means not only a cultural inheritance and tradition, but a basic anthropological condition. If we were to ignore our own history, we could only penetrate into the past archeologically. The past for us would become a distinct life form. Europe has a special relationship to its cities, its artistic treasures, its landscapes. This is what Europe really consists of. And this is where the survival of Europe lies.
So Europe is first of all a life form, a historical life feeling?
Yes, that is why in my article I insisted that we have unconditionally to preserve our distinctive forms of life. When they bombed the German cities, the Allies also knew that they could destroy German identity. In the same way, speculators are destroying the Italian landscape today with concrete, motorways and expressways. This does not just mean robbing us of our property, but of our historical identity.
So should the EU emphasize differences rather than harmonization?
Perhaps there is nowhere else in the world, apart from Europe, where such a variety of cultures and life forms is perceptible – at least at valuable moments. Earlier on, as I see it, politics was expressed in the idea of the Roman empire, later the Roman-German empire. The whole however always left the particularities of the peoples intact. It is not easy to say what could emerge today in place of this. But quite certainly a political entity by the name of Europe can only proceed from this awareness of the past. It is precisely for this reason that the present crisis strikes me as so dangerous. We have to imagine unity first of all under an awareness of differences. But quite contrary to this, in the European states, schools and universities are being demolished and financially undermined, the very institutions that should perpetuate our culture and arouse living contact between past and present. This undermining goes together with a growing museumification of the past. We have the beginning of this in many cities that are transformed into historical zones, and in which the inhabitants are forced to feel themselves tourists in their own life world.
Is this creeping museumification the counterpart of a creeping impoverishment?
It is quite clear that we are not just faced with economic problems, but with the existence of Europe as a whole – starting with our relationship to the past. The only place in which the past can live is the present. And if the present no longer perceives its own past as something living, then universities and museums become problematic. It is quite evident that there are forces at work in Europe today that seek to manipulate our identity, by breaking the umbilical cord that still links us with our past. Differences are rather being levelled out. But Europe can only be our future if we make clear to ourselves that this means first of all our past. And this past is being increasingly liquidated.
Is the crisis that is present on all sides then the form of expression of a whole system of rule, directed at our everyday life?
The concept ‘crisis’ has indeed become a motto of modern politics, and for a long time it has been part of normality in any segment of social life. The very word expresses two semantic roots: the medical one, referring to the course of an illness, and the theological one of the Last Judgement. Both meanings, however, have undergone a transformation today, taking away their relation to time. ‘Crisis’ in ancient medicine meant a judgement, when the doctor noted at the decisive moment whether the sick person would survive or die. The present understanding of crisis, on the other hand, refers to an enduring state. So this uncertainty is extended into the future, indefinitely. It is exactly the same with the theological sense; the Last Judgement was inseparable from the end of time. Today, however, judgement is divorced from the idea of resolution and repeatedly postponed. So the prospect of a decision is ever less, and an endless process of decision never concludes.
Does this mean that the debt crisis, the crisis of state finance, of currency, of the EU, is never ending?
Today crisis has become an instrument of rule. It serves to legitimize political and economic decisions that in fact dispossess citizens and deprive them of any possibility of decision. In Italy this is very clear. Here a government was formed in the name of the crisis and Berlusconi brought back to power despite this being basically against the will of the electorate. This government is just as illegitimate as the so-called European constitution. The citizens of Europe must make clear to themselves that this unending crisis – just like a state of emergency – is incompatible with democracy.
What perspectives then remain for Europe?
We must start by restoring the original meaning of the word ‘crisis’, as a moment of judgement and choice. For Europe we cannot postpone this to the indefinite future. Many years ago a high official of the then embryonic Europe, the philosopher Alexandre Kojève, assumed that homo sapiens had come to the end of history and that there were now only two possibilities left. Either the ‘American way of life’, which Kojève saw as posthistoric vegetation. Or Japanese snobbery, simply going on celebrating the empty rituals of tradition now robbed of any historical meaning. I believe that Europe could however realize the alternative of a culture that remains at the same time human and vital, because it stands in dialogue with its own history and thereby acquires new life.
Europe, understood as culture and not only as economic space, could therefore provide an answer to the crisis?
For more than two hundred years, human energies have been focused on economics. Many things indicate that the moment has perhaps arrived for homo sapiens to organize human action afresh, beyond this single dimension. Old Europe can precisely make a decisive contribution to the future here.
Translated from German. Visit FAZ website, 24 May 2013, to read the original article.
Professor Agamben, when you floated the idea in March of a ‘Latin imperium’ against Germanic domination in Europe, could you have imagined the powerful resonance this contention would have? In the meantime your essay has been translated into countless languages and passionately discussed across half the continent…
No, I didn’t expect this. But I believe in the power of words, when they are spoken at the right time.
Is the fracture in the European Union really between the economies and ways of life of the ‘Germanic’ north and the ‘Latin’ south?
I would like to make clear right away that my thesis has been exaggerated by journalists and therefore misrepresented. Its title, ‘The Latin empire should start a counter-attack’, was supplied by the editors of Libération and was taken up by the German media. It’s not something I ever said. How could I counterpose Latin culture to German, when any intelligent European knows that Italian culture of the Renaissance or the culture of classical Greece is today completely part of German culture, which reconceived it and appropriated it!
So, no dominant ‘Latin empire’? No uncultivated Germans?
In Europe, the identity of every culture always lies at the frontiers. A German such as Winckelmann or Hölderlin could be more Greek than the Greeks. And a Florentine like Dante could feel just as German as the Swabian emperor Frederick II. That is precisely what makes up Europe: a particularity that time and again oversteps national and cultural frontiers. The object of my criticism was not Germany, but rather the way in which the European Union has been constructed, that is, on an exclusively economic basis. So not only have our spiritual and cultural roots been ignored, but also our political and legal ones. If this was heard as a criticism of Germany, it is only because Germany, because of its dominant position and despite its exceptional philosophical tradition, appears unable at the present time to conceive of a Europe based on anything more than just the euro and economics.
In what way has the EU denied its political and legal roots?
When we speak of Europe today, we are faced with the gigantic repression of a painful and yet obvious truth: Europe’s so-called constitution is illegitimate. The text that was put through under this name was never voted by the peoples. Or when it was put to a vote, as in France and the Netherlands in 2005, it was frontally rejected. Legally speaking, therefore, what we have here is not a constitution, but on the contrary a treaty between governments: international law, not constitutional law. Just recently, the very respected German legal scholar Dieter Grimm recalled the fact that a European constitution lacks the fundamental, democratic element, since the European citizens were not allowed to decide on it. And now the whole project of ratification by the peoples has been silently put on ice.
That is indeed the famous ‘democratic deficit’ in the European system…
We shouldn’t lose sight of this. Journalists, particularly in Germany, have reproached me with understanding nothing of democracy, but they should consider first of all that the EU is a community based on treaties between states, and simply disguised with a democratic constitution. The idea of Europe as a constitution-giving power is a spectre that no one ventures to conjure up any more. But only with a valid constitution could European institutions regain their legitimacy.
Does this mean that you see the European Union as an illegal body?
Not illegal, but illegitimate. Legality is a question of the rules of exertion of power; legitimacy is the principle that underlies these rules. Legal treaties are certainly not just formalities, but they reflect a social reality. It is understandable therefore that an institution without a constitution cannot follow a genuine policy, but that each European state continues acting according to its egoistic interest – and today this evidently means above all economic interest. The lowest common denominator of unity is achieved when Europe appears as a vassal of the United States and takes part in wars that in no way lie in the common interest, to say nothing of the will of the people. A number of the founding states of the EU – such as Italy with its many American military bases – are more in the way of protectorates than sovereign states. In politics and militarily there is an Atlantic alliance, but certainly no Europe.
You’d therefore prefer a Latin imperium, whose way of life the ‘Germans’ would have to adapt to, to the EU…
No, it was perhaps rather provocatively that I took up Alexandre Kojève’s project of a ‘Latin imperium’. In the Middle Ages people at least knew that a unity of different political societies had to mean more than a purely political society. At that time, the uniting bond was sought in Christianity. Today I believe that this legitimation must be sought in Europe’s history and its cultural traditions. In contrast to Asians and Americans, for whom history means something completely different, Europeans always encounter their truth in a dialogue with their past. The past for us means not only a cultural inheritance and tradition, but a basic anthropological condition. If we were to ignore our own history, we could only penetrate into the past archeologically. The past for us would become a distinct life form. Europe has a special relationship to its cities, its artistic treasures, its landscapes. This is what Europe really consists of. And this is where the survival of Europe lies.
So Europe is first of all a life form, a historical life feeling?
Yes, that is why in my article I insisted that we have unconditionally to preserve our distinctive forms of life. When they bombed the German cities, the Allies also knew that they could destroy German identity. In the same way, speculators are destroying the Italian landscape today with concrete, motorways and expressways. This does not just mean robbing us of our property, but of our historical identity.
So should the EU emphasize differences rather than harmonization?
Perhaps there is nowhere else in the world, apart from Europe, where such a variety of cultures and life forms is perceptible – at least at valuable moments. Earlier on, as I see it, politics was expressed in the idea of the Roman empire, later the Roman-German empire. The whole however always left the particularities of the peoples intact. It is not easy to say what could emerge today in place of this. But quite certainly a political entity by the name of Europe can only proceed from this awareness of the past. It is precisely for this reason that the present crisis strikes me as so dangerous. We have to imagine unity first of all under an awareness of differences. But quite contrary to this, in the European states, schools and universities are being demolished and financially undermined, the very institutions that should perpetuate our culture and arouse living contact between past and present. This undermining goes together with a growing museumification of the past. We have the beginning of this in many cities that are transformed into historical zones, and in which the inhabitants are forced to feel themselves tourists in their own life world.
Is this creeping museumification the counterpart of a creeping impoverishment?
It is quite clear that we are not just faced with economic problems, but with the existence of Europe as a whole – starting with our relationship to the past. The only place in which the past can live is the present. And if the present no longer perceives its own past as something living, then universities and museums become problematic. It is quite evident that there are forces at work in Europe today that seek to manipulate our identity, by breaking the umbilical cord that still links us with our past. Differences are rather being levelled out. But Europe can only be our future if we make clear to ourselves that this means first of all our past. And this past is being increasingly liquidated.
Is the crisis that is present on all sides then the form of expression of a whole system of rule, directed at our everyday life?
The concept ‘crisis’ has indeed become a motto of modern politics, and for a long time it has been part of normality in any segment of social life. The very word expresses two semantic roots: the medical one, referring to the course of an illness, and the theological one of the Last Judgement. Both meanings, however, have undergone a transformation today, taking away their relation to time. ‘Crisis’ in ancient medicine meant a judgement, when the doctor noted at the decisive moment whether the sick person would survive or die. The present understanding of crisis, on the other hand, refers to an enduring state. So this uncertainty is extended into the future, indefinitely. It is exactly the same with the theological sense; the Last Judgement was inseparable from the end of time. Today, however, judgement is divorced from the idea of resolution and repeatedly postponed. So the prospect of a decision is ever less, and an endless process of decision never concludes.
Does this mean that the debt crisis, the crisis of state finance, of currency, of the EU, is never ending?
Today crisis has become an instrument of rule. It serves to legitimize political and economic decisions that in fact dispossess citizens and deprive them of any possibility of decision. In Italy this is very clear. Here a government was formed in the name of the crisis and Berlusconi brought back to power despite this being basically against the will of the electorate. This government is just as illegitimate as the so-called European constitution. The citizens of Europe must make clear to themselves that this unending crisis – just like a state of emergency – is incompatible with democracy.
What perspectives then remain for Europe?
We must start by restoring the original meaning of the word ‘crisis’, as a moment of judgement and choice. For Europe we cannot postpone this to the indefinite future. Many years ago a high official of the then embryonic Europe, the philosopher Alexandre Kojève, assumed that homo sapiens had come to the end of history and that there were now only two possibilities left. Either the ‘American way of life’, which Kojève saw as posthistoric vegetation. Or Japanese snobbery, simply going on celebrating the empty rituals of tradition now robbed of any historical meaning. I believe that Europe could however realize the alternative of a culture that remains at the same time human and vital, because it stands in dialogue with its own history and thereby acquires new life.
Europe, understood as culture and not only as economic space, could therefore provide an answer to the crisis?
For more than two hundred years, human energies have been focused on economics. Many things indicate that the moment has perhaps arrived for homo sapiens to organize human action afresh, beyond this single dimension. Old Europe can precisely make a decisive contribution to the future here.
Translated from German. Visit FAZ website, 24 May 2013, to read the original article.
Giorgio Agamben: La crisi perpetua come strumento di potere. Conversazione con Giorgio Agamben @ Il lavoro culturale website (Intervista originale a cura di Dirk Schümer per la FAZ)
La crisi perpetua come strumento di potere. Conversazione con Giorgio Agamben
Intervista uscita in tedesco a cura di Dirk Schümer il 24 maggio 2013 sul Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung e poi pubblicata in inglese dalla casa editrice Verso il 4 giugno 2013. La traduzione è di Nicola Perugini.
Professor Agamben, quando lo scorso marzo ha proposto l’idea di un “impero latino” contro il dominio tedesco in Europa, s’immaginava che questa idea avrebbe avuto una tale risonanza? Nel frattempo il suo saggio è stato tradotto in molte lingue e discusso appassionatamente in mezzo continente…
Giorgio Agamben: No, non me lo aspettavo. Ma credo nella forza delle parole, quando sono pronunciate al momento giusto.
La frattura dentro l’Unione Europea è davvero una frattura tra economie e modi di vita “germanico” del nord e “latino” del sud?
G.A.: Vorrei chiarire il fatto che la mia tesi è stata esagerata dai giornalisti e quindi fraintesa. Il titolo del mio articolo, “L’impero latino al contrattacco!”[1], è stato scelto dalla redazione di Libération ed è stato ripreso dai media tedeschi. Non ho mai utilizzato quella frase. Come potrei contrapporre la cultura latina a quella tedesca, quando qualsiasi europeo dotato d’intelligenza sa che la cultura italiana del Rinascimento o della Grecia classica sono oggi parte integrante della cultura tedesca, la quale le ha riformulate e se n’è appropriata!
Dunque non è una questione di “impero latino” dominante o di tedeschi ignoranti?
G.A.: L’identità di ogni cultura europea è un’identità di frontiera. Un tedesco come Winckelmann o Hölderlin potrebbe essere più greco dei greci. E un fiorentino come Dante potrebbe sentirsi tedesco quanto l’imperatore Federico II di Svevia. Questo è ciò che caratterizza l’Europa: una particolarità che non smette di oltrepassare le frontiere nazionali e culturali. L’oggetto della mia critica non era la Germania, ma il modo in cui l’Unione Europea è stata costruita, vale a dire su base esclusivamente economica. Dunque, in questo processo di costruzione sono state ignorate sia le nostre radici culturali e spirituali, sia quelle politiche e giuridiche. Se ciò è stato interpretato come una critica alla Germania, è perché la Germania, a causa della sua posizione dominante e nonostante la sua eccezionale tradizione filosofica, oggi sembra incapace di concepire un’Europa fondata su qualcosa di diverso dall’euro e dall’economia.
In che senso l’Unione Europea ha negato le sue radici politiche e giuridiche?
G.A.: Quando parliamo di Europa oggi, ci troviamo di fronte all’enorme repressione di una verità tanto dolorosa quanto ovvia: la cosiddetta costituzione europea è illegittima. Il testo varato con questo nome non è mai stato votato dai popoli europei. Quando è stato messo ai voti, ad esempio in Francia e Olanda nel 2005, è stato rifiutato con forza. Quindi, dal punto di vista legale, ciò che abbiamo non è una costituzione, bensì un trattato concordato tra governi: diritto internazionale, non diritto costituzionale. Recentemente un esperto tedesco di diritto molto rispettato come Dieter Grimm ci ha ricordato che la costituzione europea manca di un elemento democratico fondamentale, poiché ai cittadini europei non è stata concessa possibilità di esprimersi in merito. E ora l’intero progetto di ratifica popolare è stato congelato.
È proprio questo il famoso “deficit democratico” del sistema europeo…
G.A.: Non dovremmo perdere di vista questo elemento. I giornalisti, soprattutto in Germania, mi hanno accusato di non capire nulla di democrazia, ma farebbero bene a prendere in considerazione il fatto che l’Unione Europea è innanzitutto una comunità fondata su trattati tra stati camuffati con una costituzione democratica. L’idea di Europa come potere costituente è uno spettro che nessuno si azzarda più a evocare. Tuttavia è solo con una costituzione valida che le istituzioni europee potrebbero riacquisire legittimità.
Questo significa che lei vede nell’Unione Europea un’entità illegale?
G.A.: Non illegale ma illegittima. La legalità è una questione di regole con cui si esercita il potere; la legittimità è il principio che sta alla base di queste regole. I trattati legali non sono mere formalità poiché riflettono una realtà sociale. Per cui è chiaro che un’istituzione senza una costituzione non può seguire politiche sincere, e che ogni stato europeo continua ad agire secondo interessi egoistici – e oggi ciò significa chiaramente interessi economici. Il minimo comun denominatore di questa comunità si manifesta in maniera chiara quando l’Europa agisce come un vassallo degli Stati Uniti e prende parte a guerre che non sono fondate su alcun interesse comune, né sulla volontà dei popoli. Alcuni stati fondatori dell’Unione Europea –come l’Italia, con le sue molte basi americane– assomigliano più a dei protettorati che a degli stati sovrani. Nelle questioni politiche e militari c’è un Alleanza Atlantica, ma certamente non un’Europa.
Dunque lei all’Unione Europea preferirebbe un imperium latino, al cui stile di vita i “germanici” dovrebbero adattarsi…
G.A.: No, forse ho ripreso il progetto di “imperium latino” di Alexandre Kojève in maniera provocatoria. Nel Medio Evo quanto meno le persone sapevano che l’unione di società politiche diverse doveva significare qualcosa di più che una società esclusivamente politica. A quel tempo, il legame andava cercato nella cristianità. Oggi credo che questa legittimazione vada cercata nella storia dell’Europa e nelle sue tradizioni culturali. A differenza degli asiatici e degli americani, per cui la storia significa qualcosa di completamente diverso da come noi la intendiamo, gli europei incontrano sempre la verità nel dialogo con il proprio passato. Per noi il passato non significa solo un’eredità o una tradizione culturale, ma una condizione antropologica di fondo. Se ignorassimo la nostra storia potremmo solo penetrare nel nostro passato in maniera archeologica. Il passato diventerebbe per noi una forma di vita distinta. L’Europa ha una relazione speciale con le sue città, i suoi tesori artistici, i suoi paesaggi. In questo consiste l’Europa. E in questo risiede la sua sopravvivenza.
Quindi l’Europa è innanzitutto una forma di vita, una sensazione storica di vita?
G.A.: Sì, ed è per questo che nel mio articolo ho insistito sul fatto che dobbiamo preservare le nostre peculiari forme di vita. Quando gli Alleati hanno bombardato le città tedesche, sapevano che avrebbero potuto distruggere l’identità tedesca. Allo stesso modo, gli speculatori stanno distruggendo il paesaggio italiano con il cemento, le autostrade e le superstrade. Questo non significa solo derubarci di ciò che possediamo, ma anche della nostra identità storica.
Allora l’Unione Europea dovrebbe valorizzare le differenze al posto dell’armonizzazione?
G.A.: Forse non esiste un altro posto al mondo in cui è percepibile una tale varietà di culture e di forme di vita come in Europa. A mio avviso, in passato la politica si esprimeva nell’idea di impero romano, poi di impero romano-germanico. L’insieme ha sempre lasciato intatte le particolarità dei popoli. Non è facile prevedere cosa possa emergere oggi al posto di questo modello. Ma sicuramente un’entità politica che prenda il nome di Europa non può che muovere i suoi passi dalla consapevolezza del passato. È per questa ragione che la crisi attuale mi sembra così pericolosa. Dobbiamo immaginare l’unità nella piena consapevolezza delle differenze. Invece negli stati europei le scuole e le università – quelle stesse istituzioni che dovrebbero tramandare la nostra cultura e stimolare il contatto tra passato e presente – vengono demolite ed economicamente indebolite. Questo indebolimento va di pari passo con una crescente museificazione del passato. Un processo che sta prendendo piede in molte città, trasformate in zone storiche in cui gli abitanti sono costretti a sentirsi turisti negli spazi in cui vivono.
Questa museificazione strisciante va di pari passo con un impoverimento strisciante?
G.A.: È ormai chiaro che dobbiamo far fronte a problemi la cui natura non è solamente economica. La questione è l’esistenza dell’Europa nel suo insieme –a partire dalla nostra relazione con il passato. L’unico posto in cui il passato può vivere è il presente. E se il presente non percepisce più il proprio passato come un qualcosa di vivo, le università e i musei diventano problematici. È evidente che in Europa vi sono forze che cercano di manipolare la nostra identità tagliando il cordone ombelicale che ci lega al nostro passato. In questo modo le differenze vengono cancellate. Ma l’Europa può essere il nostro futuro se chiariamo a noi stessi che questo futuro significa prima di tutto il nostro passato. Un passato che si cerca sempre più di liquidare.
Dunque questa crisi è la forma di espressione di un sistema di governo che si applica alle nostre vite quotidiane?
G.A.: Il concetto di “crisi” è ormai divenuto il motto della politica moderna, e da tempo fa parte di tutte le sfere della vita sociale. La parola stessa esprime due radici semantiche: una medica, che si riferisce al percorso di una malattia, e una teologica, che si riferisce al Giudizio Universale. Tuttavia oggi entrambi i significati si sono trasformati, annullando la loro relazione con il tempo. “Crisi” nell’antica medicina significava giudizio, il momento decisivo in cui il dottore si rendeva conto se il paziente sarebbe sopravvissuto o no. Invece l’attuale interpretazione della nozione di crisi si riferisce a uno stato permanente. Dunque questa incertezza si estende al futuro, indefinitamente. La stessa cosa vale per il senso teologico di crisi: il Giudizio Universale non era separabile dalla fine del tempo. Invece oggi il giudizio viene separato dall’idea di fine e posticipato ripetutamente. Così la prospettiva di una decisione è senza fine, un interminabile processo decisionale che non si conclude mai.
Questo significa che la crisi del debito, la crisi della finanza statale, della moneta, dell’Unione Europea, sono crisi senza fine?
G.A.: Oggi la crisi è divenuta uno strumento di governo. Essa serve a legittimare decisioni politiche ed economiche che di fatto privano i cittadini di qualsiasi possibilità di decisione. Questo è estremamente chiaro in Italia, dove si è formato un governo nel nome della crisi e Berlusconi è tornato al potere contro la volontà degli elettori. Questo governo è illegittimo tanto quanto la cosiddetta costituzione europea. I cittadini europei devono rendersi conto che questa crisi senza fine –come qualsiasi stato di emergenza– è incompatibile con la democrazia.
Quali prospettive restano all’Europa?
G.A.: Dobbiamo iniziare con la riscoperta del significato originario della parola “crisi”, intesa come momento di giudizio e scelta. L’Europa non può continuare a posticipare a un futuro indefinito. Molti anni fa il filosofo Alexandre Kojève, un alto rappresentante di ciò che poi sarebbe stata l’Europa nel suo stadio embrionale, ipotizzava che l’homo sapiens era giunto alla fine della sua storia e che erano rimaste solo due possibilità. O l’“American way of life”, che Kojève vedeva come una sorta di vegetazione post-storica. O lo snobismo giapponese, una forma di celebrazione di rituali vuoti di una tradizione privata di qualsiasi significato storico. Penso che l’Europa possa rendersi conto dell’esistenza di un’alternativa, di una cultura che rimanga sia umana sia vitale, poiché in dialogo con la sua propria storia e quindi in grado di acquisire una nuova vita.
L’Europa, intesa come cultura e non solo come spazio economico, potrebbe dunque offrire una risposta alla crisi?
G.A.: Per oltre duecento anni le energie umane europee si sono focalizzate sull’economia. Molti elementi indicano che per l’homo sapiens è giunto il momento di riorganizzare l’azione umana al di là di questa dimensione esclusivamente economica. È qui che l’Europa può offrire il suo contributo al futuro.
sabato 30 marzo 2013
Giorgio Agamben - L'impero latino contro l'egemonia tedesca @ Repubblica, It, 15 marzo 2013
L’“Impero latino” contro l’egemonia tedesca
Nell'immediato dopoguerra il filosofo francese Alexandre Kojève aveva suggerito la creazione di un’unione dei paesi mediterranei accomunati da cultura e interessi. Alla luce della problematica ascesa della Germania come potenza continentale, questa idea potrebbe tornare attuale
Nel 1947 un filosofo, che era anche un alto funzionario del governo francese, Alexandre Kojève, pubblicò un testo dal titolo L'impero latino, sulla cui attualità conviene oggi tornare a riflettere. Con singolare preveggenza, l'autore affermava che la Germania sarebbe diventata in pochi anni la principale potenza economica europea, riducendo la Francia al rango di una potenza secondaria all' interno dell' Europa continentale.
Kojève vedeva con chiarezza la fine degli stati-nazione che avevano segnato la storia dell' Europa: come l' età moderna aveva significato il tramonto delle formazioni politiche feudali a vantaggio degli stati nazionali, così ora gli stati-nazione dovevano cedere il passoa formazioni politiche che superavano i confini delle nazioni e che egli designava col nome di "imperi".
Alla base di questi imperi non poteva essere, però, secondo Kojève, un' unità astratta, che prescindesse dalla parentela reale di cultura, di lingua, di modi di vita e di religione: gli imperi – come quelli che egli vedeva già formati davanti ai suoi occhi, l' impero anglosassone (Stati Uniti e Inghilterra) e quello sovietico dovevano essere «unità politiche transnazionali, ma formate da nazioni apparentate». Per questo, egli proponeva alla Francia di porsi alla testa di un "impero latino", che avrebbe unito economicamente e politicamente le tre grandi nazioni latine (insieme alla Francia, la Spagna e l' Italia), in accordo con la Chiesa cattolica, di cui avrebbe raccolto la tradizione e, insieme, aprendosi al mediterraneo.
La Germania protestante, egli argomentava, che sarebbe presto diventata, come di fatto è diventata, la nazione più ricca e potente in Europa, sarebbe stata attratta inesorabilmente dalla sua vocazione extraeuropea verso le forme dell' impero anglosassone. Ma la Francia e le nazioni latine sarebbero rimaste in questa prospettiva un corpo più o meno estraneo, ridotto necessariamente al ruolo periferico di un satellite.
Proprio oggi che l' Unione europea si è formata ignorando le concrete parentele culturali può essere utile e urgente riflettere alla proposta di Kojève. Ciò che egli aveva previsto si è puntualmente verificato. Un' Europa che pretende di esistere su una base esclusivamente economica, lasciando da parte le parentele reali di forma di vita, di cultura e di religione, mostra oggi tutta la sua fragilità, proprio e innanzitutto sul piano economico.
Qui la pretesa unità ha accentuato invece le differenze e ognuno può vedere a che cosa essa oggi si riduce: a imporre a una maggioranza più povera gli interessi di una minoranza più ricca, che coincidono spesso con quelli di una sola nazione, che sul piano della sua storia recente nulla suggerisce di considerare esemplare. Non solo non ha senso pretendere che un greco o un italiano vivano come un tedesco; ma quand' anche ciò fosse possibile, ciò significherebbe la perdita di quel patrimonio culturale che è fatto innanzitutto di forme di vita. E una politica che pretende di ignorare le forme di vita non solo non è destinata a durare, ma, come l' Europa mostra eloquentemente, non riesce nemmeno a costituirsi come tale.
Se non si vuole che l' Europa si disgreghi, come molti segni lasciano prevedere, è consigliabile pensare a come la costituzione europea (che, dal punto di vista del diritto pubblico, è un accordo fra stati, che, come tale, non è stato sottoposto al voto popolare e, dove loè stato, come in Francia,è stato clamorosamente rifiutato) potrebbe essere riarticolata, provando a restituire una realtà politica a qualcosa di simile a quello che Kojève chiamava l'“Impero latino”.
Que l’Empire latin contre-attaque !
Que l’Empire latin contre-attaque !
par Giorgio Agamben @ Libération, 24 mars 2013
En 1947, Alexandre Kojève, un philosophe qui se trouvait aussi occuper des charges de haut fonctionnaire au sein de l’Etat français, publie un essai intitulé l’Empire latin. Cet essai est d’une actualité telle qu’on a tout intérêt à y revenir.
Avec une prescience singulière, Kojève soutient sans réserve que l’Allemagne deviendra sous peu la principale puissance économique européenne et qu’elle va réduire la France au rang d’une puissance secondaire au sein de l’Europe occidentale. Kojève voyait avec lucidité la fin des Etats-nations qui avaient jusque-là déterminé l’histoire de l’Europe : tout comme l’Etat moderne avait correspondu au déclin des formations politiques féodales et à l’émergence des Etats nationaux, de même les Etats-nations devaient inexorablement céder le pas à des formations politiques qui dépassaient les frontières des nations et qu’il désignait sous le nom d’«empires». A la base de ces empires ne pouvait plus se trouver, selon Kojève, une unité abstraite, indifférente aux liens réels de culture, de langue, de mode de vie et de religion : les empires - ceux qu’il avait sous les yeux, qu’il s’agisse de l’Empire anglo-saxon (Etats-Unis et Angleterre) ou de l’Empire soviétique - devaient être des«unités politiques transnationales, mais formées par des nations apparentées».
C’est la raison pour laquelle Kojève proposait à la France de se poser à la tête d’un «Empire latin» qui aurait uni économiquement et politiquement les trois grandes nations latines (à savoir la France, l’Espagne et l’Italie), en accord avec l’Eglise catholique dont il aurait recueilli la tradition tout en s’ouvrant à la Méditerranée. Selon Kojève, l’Allemagne protestante qui devait devenir sous peu la nation la plus riche et la plus puissante d’Europe (ce qu’elle est devenue de fait), ne manquerait pas d’être inexorablement attirée par sa vocation extraeuropééene et à se tourner vers les formes de l’Empire anglo-saxon. Mais, dans cette hypothèse, la France et les nations latines allaient rester un corps plus ou moins étranger, réduit nécessairement à un rôle périphérique de satellite.

Aujourd’hui, alors que l’Union européenne (UE) s’est formée en ignorant les parentés culturelles concrètes qui peuvent exister entre certaines nations, il peut être utile et urgent de réfléchir à la proposition de Kojève. Ce qu’il avait prévu s’est vérifié très précisément. Une Europe qui prétend exister sur une base strictement économique, en abandonnant toutes les parentés réelles entre les formes de vie, de culture et de religion, n’a pas cessé de montrer toute sa fragilité, et avant tout sur le plan économique.
En l’occurrence, la prétendue unité a accusé les différences et on peut constater à quoi elle se réduit : imposer à la majorité des plus pauvres les intérêts de la minorité des plus riches, qui coïncident la plupart du temps avec ceux d’une seule nation, que rien ne permet, dans l’histoire récente, de considérer comme exemplaire. Non seulement il n’y a aucun sens à demander à un Grec ou à un Italien de vivre comme un Allemand ; mais quand bien même cela serait possible, cela aboutirait à la disparition d’un patrimoine culturel qui se trouve avant toute chose une forme de vie. Et une unité politique qui préfère ignorer les formes de vie n’est pas seulement condamnée à ne pas durer, mais, comme l’Europe le montre avec éloquence, elle ne réussit pas même à se constituer comme telle.
Si l’on ne veut pas que l’Europe finisse par se désagréger de manière inexorable, comme de nombreux signes nous permettent de le prévoir, il conviendrait de se mettre sans plus attendre à se demander comment la Constitution européenne (qui n’est pas une constitution du point de vue du droit public, comme il n’est pas inutile de le rappeler, puisqu’elle n’a pas été soumise au vote populaire, et là où elle l’a été - comme en France, elle a été rejetée à plates coutures) pourrait être réarticulée à nouveaux frais.
De cette manière, on pourrait essayer de redonner à une réalité politique quelque chose de semblable à ce que Kojève avait appelé«l’Empire latin».
Traduit de l’italien par Martin Rueff